Zimbabwe at crossroads: Is it Mnangagwa, Chiwenga, Geza or Chamisa?

1. Introduction
Zimbabwe is at the crossroads, again.

The country is again being discussed in newsrooms, churches, embassies, business chambers, beerhalls, and social media spaces for the wrong reasons.

Many analysts are predicting an imminent second coup, after the one that toppled the long-time president Robert Mugabe in November 2017.

Ironically, the alleged master mind and major beneficiary of that earlier coup, General Constantino Chiwenga and Emmerson Mnangagwa (respectively), seem to have fallen out of favour.

The main questions on people's minds are: (i) Can the status quo of having Mnangagwa at the helm continue, especially given the recent push to illegally amend the Constitution so that he remains in power beyond 2028?

(ii) Can the nation trust Blessing Geza and Chiwenga to deliver the democratic breakthrough which has eluded the country for over two decades?

(iii) Does Nelson Chamisa, the main face of opposition in the last two elections, have something up his sleeve?

(iv) Is there scope for either Geza/Chiwenga union with Chamisa or Mnangagwa embracing his two-time presidential contender to save his precarious presidency?

(v) What are the prospects of the Geza 31 March protests (today) succeeding?

This article argues that if the protests called by Geza on 31 March (today) fail to succeed, it would mainly be due to the toxicity and polarisation of the Zimbabwean politics, and that the military is at the centre of this polarisation.

2. The Current State of Affairs

To properly answer the first question on whether Mnangagwa should continue and finish his term in 2028 and possibly continue with his ED2030 agenda, we should evaluate whether his administration has fared any better than that of his predecessor, Mugabe.

Readers might be aware that Mnangagwa has been in government since 1980 and has been Mugabe's right-hand man or enforcer for more than five decades.

This means that some of the errors of omission or commission under Mugabe can equally be blamed on Mnangagwa himself.

Be that as it may, we still need to highlight the main differences between Mugabe and Mnangagwa's administrations.

Firstly, though Mugabe was widely regarded as a dictator, he never unleashed soldiers on defenceless or protesting citizens in Harare's central business district (CBD).

But Mnangagwa did, not once, but twice.

The first instance was in the full glare of international media on the 1st of August 2018.

The army responded to the protest of alleged opposition supporters who were calling for the speedy release of the election results, after the 31st of July 2018 votes.

As confirmed by the Motlanthe Commission, which was established to investigate the shooting, the soldiers were responsible for the shooting and killing of 6 people.

Some were shot at the back, showing that they were either running away (dispersing) or going about their business in town.

Having established that the military was responsible for the shooting of civilians, some of the Commission's recommendations were that the government should compensate the families of the deceased (including paying school fees for their children) and that the perpetrators should be made to account.

It is important to note that none of the five recommendations were implemented.

Some of the alleged perpetrators, including the commander of the group, Lieutenant-General Anselem Nhamo Sanyatwe, were promoted.

At the time of writing this article, Sanyatwe is now the new Sports Minister.

The second incident involving the military happened around 18-20 January 2019.

President Mnangagwa announced a 150 percent fuel price increase, and the public responded through a three-day demonstration throughout the country.

To quell the demonstration, security forces allegedly fired live ammunition, killing 17 people, and raped at least 17 women.

To mask these atrocities, the government ordered the switching off of the internet.

Secondly, the political arena had its fair share of drama. During Mnangagwa's presidency, Zimbabwe hosted two general elections in 2018 and 2023.

Both elections were highly contested.

Though the period before the 2018 election was relatively calm, save for the shooting soon after the election, the 2023 election was characterised by voter intimidation, manipulation, and outright rigging.

Many analysts and political activists noted that the rigging started with the gerrymandering of the delimitation exercise, the use of the secret service-sponsored organisation called Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ) trust, police banning of nearly 100 rallies by Nelson Chamisa fronted Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) and the artificial shortage of ballot papers in opposition strongholds such as Harare and Mutare.

For the first time since the history of elections in Zimbabwe, the SADC Election Observer Mission (SEOM) agreed with other international observer missions that the 2023 election "fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act and the SADC Principles and Guidelines". Despite these electoral challenges, Chamisa's party prevented Zanu-PF from having a two-thirds majority in parliament and swept all urban areas.

However, a state-enabled imposter was unleashed on the CCC party, and he recalled MPs, councillors, and senators at will. This led to the resignation of Chamisa in January 2024, saying his party has been "contaminated" and "hijacked" by the government.

Thirdly, the revival of the economy post-Mugabe has remained elusive.

When he came to power in November 2017, Mnangagwa's main message was that "Zimbabwe was open for business" and promised to deliver an upper-middle-income status by 2030. However, Mnangagwa has presided over two attempts to revive the Zimdollar with minimal success.

The economy is still experiencing macroeconomic instability with the government, business, and the public refusing to accept the new currency, ZiG.

Furthermore, major businesses have been closing, and the economy continues to informalise. This has forced the government to introduce more taxes to raise funds for the fiscus, thus further choking formal businesses.

More than 50 percent of Zimbabweans are estimated to be living in extreme poverty, while the health, education, and local government sectors have literally collapsed.  Social media has been awash with pictures of pothole-infested roads, hospitals without medication or proper equipment, and school children in makeshift classrooms.

Many economists have blamed the worsening economic situation on corruption and command-type policies, which are not friendly to businesses.

Based on these social, economic, and political developments under Mnangagwa, many Zimbabweans are against the ED2030 agenda.

Even some in Zanu PF, have questioned the merit of pushing for term limit extension, ostensibly to allow Mnangagwa to continue with his development projects.

Those who remember, from 2000, Mugabe justified his continued stay in power, saying he wanted to finish his highly controversial land reform programme. It seems that both think that only they can 'finish' what they could have started, and no one else! What about succession and even mortality?

3. The Geza-Chiwenga and the Military Factor

It is well-documented that the Zimbabwean military has been playing a decisive role in the politics of Zimbabwe, noticeably after the formation of a stronger opposition to Zanu-PF, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the early 2000s.

Many historians and political commentators on Zimbabwe trace the king-making role of the military in Zanu-PF in particular and Zimbabwean politics in general to the Mgagao Declaration of 1975.

As part of this declaration, the combatants (now war veterans) rejected the then Zanu leader Ndabaningi Sithole and installed Mugabe as the new leader.

As part of supporting Mugabe's presidential bid against his main challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai, in 2002, the late General Vitalis Zvinavashe declared that "the highest office on the land is a 'straight jacket' whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle."

Subsequent generals and military commanders have continued to reinforce this message.

Of note is the statement by General Chiwenga in 2016 that as the military, they were "stockholders of the country . . . some are stakeholders. Stakeholders will come and go, but stockholders have nowhere to go, so we stockholders, we come with it [Zimbabwe]".

After the coup in November 2017, Chiwenga is also quoted as having said that "it is pertinent to restate that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces remain the major stockholder in respect to the gains of the liberation struggle and when these are threatened, we are obliged to take corrective measures".

The then Zimbabwe National Army commander, Lt. Gen Anselem Sanyatwe, was captured on video addressing a Zanu-PF rally in the eastern parts of Zimbabwe, declaring that people would be frog-marched to polling stations, and "Zanu PF will rule forever, whether you like it or not. Speaking as the Army Commander, I can tell you that we are going to use what is called command voting. Forward with Zanu PF, forward with Mnangagwa, down with our opponents."

Given this background, where the army has been partisan, supporting the ruling party and on numerous occasions been used to kill opposition supporters and ordinary citizens, it would be understandable that the majority of Zimbabweans do not trust the Geza-Chiwenga faction of Zanu-PF. Though Geza, on behalf of war veterans, has apologised to the citizens, it's still too early to tell whether the apology was accepted.

The biggest elephant in the room remains the military. As mentioned above, Zimbabweans decided to protest, and on both occasions, the army used live ammunition against them. Many people, though they support the call for ED to go, and agree with Geza's grievances against Mnangagwa, especially on the issue of corruption and general economic collapse, they wonder whether the army would 'allow' them to protest.

I have carried out a mini-survey of around 25 people who are in my contact list and are currently in Harare, Masvingo, and Bulawayo.

All of them said corruption was the main issue and would want to see the back of Mnangagwa as soon as possible.

When asked whether they would join the protest on the 31st of March 2025, more than 90 percent said they would rather watch and pray.

Of this 90 percent, 80 percent said they could have gone if Chamisa was involved; otherwise "tingangoshandiswazwe" (we will be used again).

The lack of trust between citizens and the military and the lack of 'signal' from Chamisa might dampen the prospects of the 31 March protests.

This brings us to the last point: is there scope for either Geza/Chiwenga union with Chamisa or Mnangagwa embracing his two-time presidential contender to save his precarious presidency?

4. Can Chamisa be the Kingmaker?  

Despite Chamisa officially resigning from his party, CCC, in January 2024, his political shadow continues to hover over the entire nation.

Recently, a lot of articles and social media posts have been written, some critical of Chamisa, alleging that he was 'bought' to support the status quo, while others are strongly arguing that he should not be involved in Zanu-PF factional battles.

There is, however, another group that argues that Chamisa should stand against corruption and mutilation of the constitution.

This latter group sees an opportunity for Chamisa and Geza/Chiwenga to unite over these two 'national issues'. Even some of Chamisa's staunch supporters seem to have taken the view that this unity of purpose might lead to the possibility of establishing a transitional government, instead of Geza/Chiwenga fighting alone and coming up with another 'chinhu chedu' like what happened after the coup in 2017.

There is a general sentiment among Zimbabweans that this alleged fight in Zanu-PF can turn out to be a 'good crisis' with the potential to deliver the much sought-after democratic breakthrough.

There is a general realisation, even within Zanu-PF, the military, and those who have been arguing that Mnangagwa should be given a chance, that Zimbabwe is actually worse off now than it was before November 2017.

There is a realisation that the collapse of the health, education, and other sectors is hurting everyone irrespective of political affiliation. Is it not a fact that only the few politically connected are benefiting while the rest wallow in poverty?

I would want to argue that it might not be now, but the conditions are now ripe for Zimbabweans to come together and talk about how they can rebuild their country.

Everyone is hurting and wants an economy that works for everyone, leaving no one or no place behind.

We seem to want the very same thing, an inclusive democratic developmental state.