Zipra: The Wankie campaign

Once agreement had been reached, preparation for the campaign began. A joint political and military High Command was formed. Tambo and James Chikerema, the head of ZAPU in exile, directed the political level, while Joe Modise (MK commander), Akim Ndhlovu (ZIPRAcommander), Archie Sibeko (Zola Zembe, MK chief of operations), Dabengwa(ZAPU chief of intelligence), Mjojo(General Thalia, MK chief of staff), Walter Mavuso (Mavuso Msimang, MK chief of communications) and Chris Hani ( MK commissar) assumed responsibility at the military level for personnel, reconnaissance, intelligence and logistics. The latter involved the acquisition of ammunition and food supplies for the mission, as well as the means to transport them. The intelligence was left to ZAPS, due to their knowledge of the terrain and its people. ZAPU also undertook to conduct an awareness campaign in the area of the proposed operation so as to ensure a good reception for the MK guerrillas by local residents.

Modise and Joe Matthews began to assemble the MK fighting Units. Chris Hani was to be commissar, while John Dube of ZIPRA would command joint MKand ZIPRA units. In honour of the ANC president, Chief Albert Luthuli, who died personnel chief, and Ben Makhubu( alias Lefty Mathebula) to transport the arms from Tanzania to Zambia through the crossing point at Tunduma.

The required befriending, politicising and sometimes bribing both the Tanzanian and Zambian border officials. Once the military hardware had been smuggled into Zambia, it was buried at various locations on the Zambian Side of the Zambezi Valley. Mtshali was also responsible for establishing military bases near crossing points. Mk cadres volunteered to take part in the joint mission. In early 1967, they were moved from the camps in Tanzania to the ZAPU camp outside Lusaka. There were relatively small contingent of MK soldiers, although one of them claimed that this group contained 33 members. Joint training with ZIPRA was not without problems. An MK cadre later said that, unlike MK, most of the ZIPRA fighters had no political education and that this gave rise to lack of discipline in the camps. Three ZIPRA members deserted, claiming they could not understand the basic principles of the alliance. In addition, different life styles and privileges also caused problems. Some south African guerrillas found some of the ZAPU leaders rude and merciless, but despite all these problems, a form of mutual understanding and acceptance by both sides was finally reached. Chris Hani was among those involved in final preparations for the Wankie campaign in the southern part of Zambia, near Rhodesia border, while James April and others Chris Hani was among those involved in final preparations for the Wankie campaign in the southern part of Zambia, near Rhodesia border, while James April and others trained near Lusaka. A reconnaissance team, which include Lehlohonolo Lambert Moloi, was given the task of establishing a base on the Zambezi river at Livingstone, to familiarise themselves with the river and possible crossing points. According to Moloi, they 'reconnoitred that border from KaribaDam right up to Katilunge. I had teams of people doing this. Then we joint with ZAPU. And ZAPU comrades came in and then I was leading that corps of ZAPU/ANC on infiltration. Moloi team also had to observe what wild life was around and how they reacted to the presence of humans, inspect the riverbanks and monitor the flow of the river. By July 1967, they had identified the the best points at which to cross the Zambezi and hideouts and supply caches had been set up.

Three crossing points were identified: near Livingstone in the west; near lake Kariba in the centre; and near Feira in the east. The first crossing would take place at the Kazangula, near Livingstone. Senior leaders if the ANC and MK, including Oliver Tambo, Modise and Thomas Nkobi, who was by then the ANC's chief representative in Zambia, came to camp to see the cadres on their way. The night before the crossing, Tambo ordered that one of the beasts from the farm be slaughtered for the departing cadres. On the night of 30-31 July 1967, a group numbering about 80 strong crossed east of Livingstone, 15km below the Victoria Falls. This was the nucleus of the Western Front guerilla activity that became known as the Wankie campaign.

The point chosen for the crossing was deliberately close to the Botswana border, and the guerrillas could have retreated into that country if it becomes necessary. More importantly, it was a crossing point that the Rhodesian armed forces would have least expected the guerrillas to use, in the most dangerous stretch of Zambezi River. Defensive positions were set up while the crossing in progress, in case the enemy appeared unexpectedly. Ropes were tied to study trees along the riverbank and connected to a raft in the water. Guerrillas were expected to slide down the face of the cliff using these ropes and drop onto the raft or into the water. Although neither Tambo nor Modise would go to Wankie, they led the way down the cliff, followed by Nkobi, and remained on Zambezi side of the river until all the cadres had crossed safely. Members of the MK reconnaissance unit, Boston Gagarin and David Sibiya ( then known as Guluva) took the guerrillas across in a small boat, one at the time. The situation was frightening, the river currents being particularly strong, but since their President and commander in chief were standing there giving them the instructions, the guerrillas had no choice. They slithered down the ropes until they reached the tiny boat, and Thomas Nkobi later wrote:
Ropes had been tied to trees, and to reach the river from the bank, one had to grab the rope and cling to it. From the height we were at, you could not even see a person when he reached the river down below. Only the sound of something landing in water would indicate that somebody had reached the bottom. The majority of men could not swim, but the first man across the river was Hani . It took all night for the the entire group to make the crossing, and there were much jubilation when the last man set foot on the Rhodesia soil. The success of crossing greatly contributed to building morale and bringing the MK and ZIPRA was vital, as they would have to depend entirely on the ZIPRA cadres to establish contacts in RRhodesia. Ron Reid-Daly, who later commanded Rhodesia's Sellouts Scouts, speculated that the infiltration's objective was the confluence of the Tewani and Nata Rivers, where the guerrillas intended to set up a base camp from which MK could launch attacks into the northernmost region of South Africa, while ZIPRA concentrate on Matebeleland.

According to Mpanza, however, the plan from the start was for South African guerrillas moving south to split into a number of smaller units of about eight members each, enter South Africa and base themselves in the Transvaal, Durban, Transkei and Cape Town. Some units were to proceed eastwards, in order to establish an MK presence in Rhodesia. It took detachment two days of hard marching to reach the Wankie Game Reserve. Mpanza recalled:
Then they (ZAPU) led us from there and told us about camps in that vicinity and about camp guards who were protecting the game. They instructed us to avoid such places and not to make any noise. Smoking of cigarettes was also not allowed. The commander was the only person who gave people the necessary permission to smoke. Then Chris was chosen to lead the reconnaissance. Mnqarwana ( alias Mjojo, alias Lennox Lagu, real name Tshali) was the commandere of the whole group. Then we proceeded together with our respective units until we reached the middle part of the game reserve. We managed to avoid some of the camps, using detours. I think it was on the fourteenth day inside the forest when we ran out of food and other things. It was only then when we decided to kill the game, and we ate the meat. We took what was left with us. We proceeded until we reached the far end of the forest. This was now open space. The forest was no longer thick with trees and Vegetation. We then decided to take rest. We sat down after taking a detour away from the forest. This place was very big. We therefore went around the forest.we proceeded and suddenly there was a place towards Tsholotsho where we found water. There was a sand river where you had to dig before you could access the water. Our Rhodesian ( ZAPU) comrades taught us how to drink this water. It was at that stage that we prepared ourselves for the war.

As it moved inland, the detachment encountered its first major problem, which had not been anticipated. They were moving into an increasingly dry area where the local residents relied on boreholes for water, and it became necessary to establish contact with them sooner than planned. The people they approached were cooperative and gave them enough food and water for a few days, which they supplemented by collecting fruits and berries and killing wild animals. Blaming pointed out that as part of their training in Egypt, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, they had been taught to kill and eat reptiles and wild animals, and this knowledge came in useful in the Wankie Game Reserve, which was teaming with game. Their training also helped them understand the movement of the animals, and by following their tracks, the guerrillas found water, though the supplies were inadequate fir their needs.

The bush was so dense that a number of guerrillas who became separated from the detachment were need never to meet it again. Tshali recalled that soon after crossing into Rhodesia, Nqose and three were reconnoitering ahead of the detachment and were unable to reunite with it. A few other guerrillas were despatched to look for them, only to get lost themselves. If people disappeared ... you know, it's so treacherous. The trees are the same. It's just a flat thing. If somebody disappears and you move a short distance away from the others, you would have to shout. And that was not allowed there, no, otherwise you are going to call the enemy, said Tshali. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that most of the ZIPRA cadres were not familiar with the Wankie area.

When the detachment reached the game reserve around 2 August, it split into two units. One moved into southwesterly direction towards Botswana, in accordance with instructions to make for South Africa and go underground. John Dube of ZIPRA was in command of the 57 members and Chris Hani was the commissar charged with the responsibility of ensuring that MK cadres infiltrated South Africa safely. Members of this unit included Peter Mfene, Victor Dlamini, Graham Morodi, Douglas Wana, Basil February, James April, Paul Stole, Shooter Makasi, Castro Mashigo, Eric Nduna, Justice Mpanza, Cletus Mzimela, Peter Mhlongo, Marana Mahlatsi, Misheak Madiba and Lennox Lagu. The rest of the detachment, about 23 cadres under command of ZIPRA's Madzimba Matho, with Adries Motsepe of MK as his deputy, move towards Lupane in northeast Matebeleland. MK members in the smaller unit included James Masimini, Charles Mhabi, Motsepe, and Comrade Rodgers. Their orders were to remain in Rhodesia and set up a communications network between ANC members jn exile and those based in South Africa, and map out route for future MK cadres to use on their way to South Africa. ZIPRA guerrillas had previously established themselves in the Lupane and Nkayi areas from April to June 1966, and this probably influenced the decision of the ZAPU and ANC leadership to set up base there in 1967. The Luthuli Detachment comprised a relatively small percentage of the more than 500 MK cadres who were in the camps in Zambia and Tanzania. MK's personnel chief, Eric Mtshali, had been ordered to prepare more cadres to cross through Rhodesia as soon as news was received of the detachment's safe passage. Mtshali was to return to South Africa with the the very last group. Not long after the detachment split up, Rhodesia security forces detected the group heading east towards Lupane. Some observers have speculated that a ZIPRA member, who deserted on 3 August from the group moving northeast, revealed the detachment's presence in the Wankie Game Reserve, and over the next 10 days Rhodesian patrols in the area were stepped up.

However some hold the view that Rhodesian forces encountered the detachment accidentally, during routine patrols, while Reid-Daly maintains that their tracks were picked up at the Inyantui River, near the main Victoria Falls road, and that the Rhodesian forces had already increased the number of patrols in the Game reserve after becoming aware that ZIPRA was infiltrating this area. Another possible explanation was offered by the Star's Africa News Service in a report that stated:

One of the reasons for the failure of the terrorist in the past is the suspicion of the Rhodesian rural Africans and the cooperation of the tribal authorities, chiefs and headmen, in passing back the information to the troops and police as soon as the infiltration across the border. The early detection of the unit was particularly surprising because of the strict precautions taken. The cadres had spotted vehicle tracks in the vicinity of their camp and were thus aware of the presence of Rhodesian security forces. The guerrillas knew that Rhodesian forces were more active during the day and consequently, they travelled at night, sleep by day in carefully concealed trenches. As they moved closer to Matebeleland, the dense bush that had offered excellent cover gave way to scruland, requiring even greater vigilance, and they stopped shooting animals so as not to alert the enemy to their position. Some of the hazards were the results of poor preparation for the mission. For example the detachment had outdated and inaccurate maps, and frequently had to rely on the stars to guide them. The first battle between the joint ANCIENT/ZAPU unit and the Rhodesian security forces occurred 13 August on the banks of Nyatuwe River, between Wankie and Dete. According to Reid-Daly, a Rhodesian African Raffles(RAR) patrol consisting of 18 Africansoldiers and a numbers of British SouthAfrican Policemen (ASAP) were following the tracks of the guerrillas and were ambushed at 1:20pm. After a battle lasting seven and half hours, the Rhodesian forces fled, losing two African soldiers, two white BSAP officers and a white army officer, in addition to two African soldiers being wounded. When they returned that night to retrieve the bodies of the dead, the Rhodesians forces found five dead guerrillas. Comrade Rogers offered a different account of the battle. According to him, the guerrillas had set up a temporary Camp on the banks the Nyatuwe River early in the morning. At about 7 am a spotter aircraft began circling the area above their camp, which was attacked 90minutes later by the Rhodesian security forces. Rogers wrote: This sudden volley from the enemy, coupled with whitemen (sic) voices shouting 'surrender' unnerved some of the comrades. There was some confusion. But fortunately, some of the comrades took positions and return fire. Masimini was shooting on top of his voice, saying he would shoot any son of a bitch who ran away, ordering them to fire back. Others had merely taken cover and were not firing at the enemy. Helicopters were used to support the Rhodesian forces, and comrade Rogers reported that one of the helicopters left the scene with smoke billowing from its tail. He also reported that as the fighting progressed, more and more of the guerrillas detachment's rifles fell silent, until only two could be heard. Late in the afternoon the guerrillas retreated under covering fire provided by James Masimini. Masimini is remembered by many of his heroic sacrifice. Despite being badly wounded, he told his comrades to leave him behind and escape to safety.

Delmas Sibanyoni was another brave individual who stood his ground against the Rhodesian forces until he was killed by gun fire from a helicopter. Some seven or eight days later, Comrade Rodgers was among the remaining members of the unit to be captures or killed. Rodgers and Bothwell were subsequently sentenced to death by Rhodesians.South African newspapers reported that during a battle of 18 August, eight guerrillas, believed to be from a group of 30 members of the banned African National Congress trying to make their way to South Africa, were killed in Wankie Game Reserve. Another six guerrillas had been captured. According to the reports, the Rhodesian security forces had suffered no casualties. The unit that was moving south heard about the battle on a portable radio they carried. As a tactic to demoralise other units and bring about their surrender, the Rhodesian government announced that a large number of fighters had been captured and several killed. A day after the first clash, the Rhodesian security forces dropped thousands of leaflets printed in English and Shona over a small area of the Zambezi Valley, calling the terrorists to surrender. The leaflets contained photographs of two guerrillas who allegedly recently gave themselves up to security forces, and send the following massage to the guerrillas: You are far from your home. Do you want to die? You have been sent by your leaders in Lusaka to fight against us in Rhodesia. These men refuse to come themselves because they know our strength and do not want to die. They sent you to die for them.

The propaganda had no effect on the second unit, which proceeded as planned, but Tshali speculated that members of the smaller unit showered taken prisoner might have revealed the existence of the other unit to the Rhodesians. When news of the military encounter between the MK/ZIPRA forces and Rhodesians reached Lusaka, Tambo summoned Eric Mtshali, informed him that the Rhodesians had encircled a section of the Luthuli detachment near Zambezi River and instructed Mtshali to organise and lead a rescue team into Rhodesia. Mtshali and Akim Ndlovu, ZAPU commander, assembled a group of twelve, including Eric Manzi from Port Elizabeth, who was Mtshali's regional head of intelligence. They reached the river in the morning and camped for a day, intending to observe enemy movement on the opposite bank. That night, while crossing the river in three rubber dinghies, disaster struck. Mtshali recalled:

As we were alighting from our boat on the Zimbabwe side of the river, we noticed that one boat had capsized. In no time water around it turned red with blood. Two comrades were swimming frantically towards the shore. They never made any sound and, up to this day, I do not know why they never screamed. Two others others had disappeared without a trace. All we could see was a pack of crocodiles fighting over their limbs. It was a very disturbing sight, and we were all taken aback and furious to loose soldiers that way.I was very demoralising experience.

Within seconds, the river was swarming with crocodiles. The cadre in the water never had a chance, and to make matters worse, a radio massage was sent from Lusaka informing Mtshali that men trapped at Lupane had shot their way out, breaking through the Rhodesian cordon and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy forces. We were told to cross back to Zambia, Mtshali said. Meanwhile, the unit led by Dube and Hani had its first glimpse of Smith's forces immediately after receiving news of the clashes in northeastern Matebeleland.