Opinion / Interviews
Formation of Patriotic Front
26 Nov 2017 at 03:26hrs | Views
DUE to circumstances beyond our control, over the last three publications we were not able to publish this column. However, the brutally frank, Comrade Chrispen Tapfuma Mataire (born February 24, 1945 in Chivhu), whose Chimurenga name was David Todhlana (pictured right) is back with his fascinating series.
In this interview with our team comprising Munyaradzi Huni and Tendai Manzvanzvike, Todhlana who boasts of a Degree in Political Science and Political Administration from the University of Zimbabwe speaks about how his ideas gave birth to the Wampua College in Mozambique. He speaks about the clash between the Zanu leaders and their Zanla commanders as they prepared for the Geneva Conference, leading to his arrest in 1977.
Read on …
SM: Comrade, can you tell us briefly about Zipa?
Todhlana: We had to go into Zipa because we were told by the Front Line States that if you want to start the war, Zipra and Zanla have to unite. The other instruction was that we don't want vanaMugabe, vanaNkomo and other leaders messing up with Zipa. They must keep out of it.
While this was happening, as Zipra we continued calling for the release of our leaders from prisons in Lusaka. Remember some of the Zanu leaders had been arrested after the death of Chitepo. Unfortunately, no one was listening to us.
Preparations for the Geneva Conference started. It was suggested that if possible Zanu and Zapu should form one organisation to go to Geneva. The Front Lines States were saying the Zanu and Zapu positions were not very different so we were supposed to unite. This is when the Patriotic Front was formed. Just for the purpose of attending the Geneva Conference.
As freedom fighters, under Zipa we were invited to Geneva. However, by this time, the Zipra comrades had already pulled out of Zipa. Even some Zipra comrades we had deployed at the war front, they had left. It was now Zipa in name, but as Zanla we were still making efforts to have our Zipra comrades back.
I remember Report Mphoko was the Zapu representative in Maputo. We had a meeting with him saying "Report, why don't you impress upon your comrades, Mangena and others to come back to Zipa?" We also told him that Geneva was going to be a waste of time. As freedom fighters we were supposed to continue the war.
SM: Why were you convinced that nothing would come out of the Geneva Conference?
Todhlana: The war had stopped from around 1974 until the time of détente. It was now 1976 and there was no war. The Smith regime was not feeling any pinch or anything. There was nothing to motivate them to talk to us. We were supposed to hit them hard enough, so that they could seek audience from us. Taifanirwa kumborova varungu stereki. This was our position.
On the other hand we continued saying, anyone who wanted to engage us as the Zipra component in Zipa, first talk about releasing our leaders who were in Zambian prisons. We said take our leaders from the prisons and take them to Geneva. These are the people you are supposed to talk to, not us. Or take vanaMugabe not us. Isusu we want to fight.
So some comrades went to Geneva, but apparently, vana Nkomo from Zapu had their commanders, like Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Masuku and others who were the Zipra component of Zipa. The Zanla component in Zipa had refused to go the Geneva. We refused. So Nkomo and his commanders were representing Zapu and from Zanu there was Mugabe and others, but with no commanders. Mugabe had been joined by Zanu comrades who had been released from Zambian prisons, like Tongogara and others.
While in Geneva, some journalists provoked a situation. They asked Mugabe kuti we can see vaNkomo with his commanders, where are your commanders? VaMugabe defended himself saying ndinana Tongogara and others, but this was not accepted zvichinzi, these people were in jail in Zambia. We want Zanla commanders under Zipa who were executing the war. These were journalists provoking vaMugabe. This got into the minds of our Zanu leaders and the commanders who had been released from prisons in Zambia. So they sent Kangai to Maputo to come and meet us. His task was to persuade us to go to Geneva. He came and spoke to us and we told him that there was no reason for us to go to Geneva. We repeated that varungu hatisati tavarova enough for them to agree to negotiate with us. We told him that Geneva was just an exercise in futility. We said imi continue talking nevarungu isu we intensify the war. We said our intensification of the war would result in real negotiations. Kangai went back to Geneva empty handed. VaMugabe then sent Rugare Gumbo. He came and told us that kwanzi naShef huyai. We told him that our response was the same as we had given to Kangai. We are not coming. Rugare went back to Geneva with the same message. Then came iye mbune Tongo saying kwanzi navaMugabe ini sacommander wenyu ndiuye kuzokutorai. We held a meeting with Tongo and told him the same message. We told him that our focus was on the armed struggle. We told him that hondo had just resumed in April 1976 after yamira from December 1974. The war has just resumed. Geneva is just a gimmick yevarungu. So Tongo went back to Geneva empty handed.
After Tongo had left, we were summoned by Samora Machel. We went for the meeting and he was lecturing to us saying "macomrades you lack experience. In politics there is time to fight and time to negotiate. How many revolutions dzamakanzwa dzekuti soldiers ended vava in the capital city after over-running the enemy? In every situation you end up at the negotiating table. What do you lose when you talk?"
Zvino tangoti tuzu kuburitsa maziso. Samora pointed at me and said, "iwe, you are a KBG agent." I could not understand what he was talking about. He said stop all this stubbornness. He ordered us to choose a team of five commanders who were to go to Geneva. He made it very clear that this was an order and not for negotiation. We had no option because we were in Mozambique and Samora was our host.
SM: So who are the commanders you chose?
Tondlana: We chose Dzino, Gwauya, Rex Nhongo, Elias Hondo. I can't remember the fifth one. We were told to remain behind to intensify the war. But personally, I didn't play a big role in the intensification of the war. I had a special task.
SM: What was this special task?
Tondlana: Remember I told you that I received my military training in the Soviet Union? While in Soviet Union I was reading a lot about Marxism and Leninism. I also read a lot about revolutions across the globe. So when I arrived in Mozambique from Mboroma in Zambia, I was appointed as the commander of Chibavava Camp. I was not a member of the Zipa command. While at Chibavava my deputy was Mark Dube. Joice Mujuru was my third in command. There were several other camps around like Nyadzonya, Doroi and so on.
While at Chibavava I noticed that one of the comrades who was really interested in Marxism and Leninism was Dzino. I could see that we had differences but akanga ari mumwe wangu panyaya yeMarxism and Leninism. One day I left Chibavava Camp and went to Chimoio where Dzino was based. I then asked him kuti why don't we start an ideological college to teach our fighters? I said through this college lets transform our revolution from being a democratic national bourgeoisie revolution yekuti nyika yedu isununguke, yekuti vanhu vatema vazvitonge. I said I think we should go a step further and establish a socialist revolution. Dzino quickly understood me. He asked me what I had in mind. I told him lets establish this school at Chimoio and select comrades, especially those who had gone up to Form Four to be the students. He agreed to my ideas. Around February to April 1976, I was given the greenlight to establish the college and I coined it as the Wampua College. Wampua was a name that had been given to a college in 1922 in China when the Chinese Communist Party was formed. Most teachers at this college were from Soviet Union teaching communism. Dzino assisted me to pick some comrades who had the potential to come and be part of the team.
SM: Who are some of these comrades?
Tondlana: Happison Muchechetere, Basopo Mupangara, Chaitezvi and others. But all these comrades I didn't know much about their capacity. Dzino knew them well because he had trained some of them at Mgagao. After assembling this team, we started teaching our students. This college takaivaka nehuswa nemapango. We actually sat down to compile the syllabus and the books required. But much of the work, taiita from our heads. We would get books from wherever we could.
SM: What exactly where you teaching the cadres at this college?
Tondlana: We were introducing the cadres to the concepts of Marxism and Leninism. We would tell the cadres that we look forward that our revolution would transform from being national democratic – just to free ourselves from the foreign yoke. We told them that this revolution would produce a capitalist state. We told them that we wanted a socialist revolution, as was in China, Soviet Union and son on. Our idea was that we take advantage of these socialist countries that were supporting us to skip the capitalist state and go straight into socialism. This is what we were teaching the cadres. This is where I told you earlier on that I wanted to multiply myself a million times. Everybody to think like Davie.
However, I didn't stay for long at this college. In August 1976, after the death of one of the members of the Zipa High Command, Kaguri who was the director for supplies, I was appointed to replace him. I refused to take up the post. I told Dzino and Rex Nhongo that there was no need for me to be moved from the college. They however insisted and I was ordered to leave Wampua College. I left the college with a grain of salt. I was enjoying what I was doing at the college.
SM: We hear that you were later arrested. Tell us why and how?
Tondlana: Yes, I was arrested in 1977. After the Geneva Conference, the comrades came back. Our leaders now knew the influential role yaDzino. They tried to dispatch him to Europe to mobilise resources for the party. They wanted to do this so that they could come kumacamps Dzino asiko. Dzino refused to go. Dzino knew that these leaders were up to something since they had to use Samora to force them to attend the Geneva Conference. As we were refusing to go to Geneva, our leaders said we had defied their orders. We were labelled sevanhu vapunduka. So when they were preparing to come back from Geneva, Dzino was assigned to go to Europe. They knew of his influential role.
When the team arrived from Geneva, Tongo came to Chimoio to organise meetings. We had about two to three meetings with Tongo, but we could see there was tension. Yanga yava tension inobatika. Terrible tension. You know Tongo was huge and he had these big eyes.
To be continued next week
SM: Yeah, even from pictures he looks quite frightening.
Todhlana: But I had misgivings with Tongo. In 1973, Zanu used to have bi-annual conferences in Zambia. After every two years, there would be an elective conference. I didn't attend this particular bi-annual conference but I heard from many who attended that conference that the way it was run was unheard of. Apparently, before this conference the other conferences were attended by povo in Zambia. The commanders did not attend such conferences.
But this was now 1973 and we had started the war in 1972, commanders were asked to attend the conference. When they came they participated in terms of voting kuti vaipinda mudare reChimurenga ndivanani. Most of these commanders didn't know much about the party leadership and when they were told to vote, who do you think they voted for? They came up with this Bereka Mwana Concept. Munhu aiyenda kunomira kumashure kwemunhu that he or she supported. We are told that vanaTongo would direct the fighters kuti iwe enda unomira kumashure kwemunhu uyo and uyo.
Remember Tongo was very popular with the forces and they did what he told them to do. Tongo was popular not because he was good hearted or that he was a good planner. He was popular because he was always with the fighters. Ainge ainesu. Kutraining, it was Tongo, kuwar front it was Tongo.
You know William Ndangana was the chief of defence while Tongo came second as chief of operations. This was before 1973. The tables were then turned when Tongo became chief of defence. William Ndangana went to foreign affairs. The fighters didn't know Ndangana so they supported Tongo. Ndangana never visited us at the war front and as fighters we didn't know him even though he was chief of defence. This is how Tongo took over the reins of the defense portfolio. This is what I heard and from that perspective I was not happy.
Another thing was the death of Badza and Nhari. Following this conference, things were not well in Zanu. There was some measure of tension. Those who were preponderant before this conference were the Manyikas. They held most of the influencial posts in Zanu. Chairman Chitepo was a Manyika, Mutambanengwe and others were all Manyikas. MaZezuru nemaKaranga vakanga vari vashoma. Now in 1973, people like Rugare Gumbo got into Dare ReChimurenga. He was coming from school in Canada. Who voted him? Aimuziva ndiani? Ko Kumbira Kangai apinda chirudzii? These were activists who had been turned into Zanu representatives in countries where they were studying. How did they find themselves into Dare?
SM: How did they maneuver?
Tondlana: This is the million-dollar question. Gumbo and Kangai came at the same time. My suspicion is that it was Tongo who was manipulating the system. Rugare Gumbo is Karanga and Tongo was a Karanga. Kangai was half-Manyika and half-Karanga. Handiti aiva wekuBuhera? This is my suspicion. I however, don't have concrete evidence that this is what exactly happened.
SM: Let's go back to the story of your arrest.
Todhlana: After Geneva Conference flopped, everybody came back. We held meetings with Tongo as commanders. During the meetings I suggested that the Zanla High Command should change. I was making my contribution during discussions. Tongo vakagara apo. We were discussing. I suggested that lets increase the number of the people in the High Command from the current 18 to 24 or more. I said this would increase the efficiency of the High Command. As I was suggesting this, I had something behind my mind.
SM: What was that?
Tondlana: I was saying in my mind, I don't hold in high esteem members of High Command yaTongo. Some of them were semi-illiterate.
SM: Like who?
Tondlana: Like Joseph Chimurenga. Rex Nhongo was Standard Six? Elias Hondo, I think Grade Three? Chinamaropa, Chauke like the whole shoot of them. None of them could boost kuti ndakaenda kuchikoro. Even iye Tongo had gone Form 2. I could see that these comrades could not embrace and understand the ideology that I wanted to push.
My wish was to take the commander from Tete Province into the High Command, then commander from Gaza province, commander from Chibavava, commander from Nyadzonya and others to them six. I knew all these comrades had passed through Wampua College. So I wanted the number of the High Command to be increased not that they were few but because I underrated them.
SM: Don't you think you were being over-ambitious?
Tondlana: Hooo, that's your judgement?
SM: No, I am just asking. We want to know because look you had a history of coming from Zipra. Now you wanted to change things in Zanla High Command. Weren't you being too ambitious?
Tondlana: (laughs) I really don't know. So after this discussion, Rex held me by the hand. He led me into a nearby orchard. He then said; "Davie, I appreciate what you want to do. I really appreciate what you are trying to do, but Davie you are better off fighting from within." He then said; "food for thought." He walked away.
I later realized that Rex was giving me a warning that Davie you are better of fighting from within meaning usadzingwe from Zanu. So the message was play it cool. Lie low.
SM: Why was Rex Nhongo giving you this advice?
Todhlana: Rex was my cousin brother. We come from the same area. Takasangana kuhondo tikazivana. So we established a good relationship. He also knew sincerely that Davie vanoda zverevolution. His message was usadzingwa from Zanu.
SM: Is there any other person who was in support of your idea?
Tondlana: I never sold it to anybody. I just spoke about it in that meeting. This was a preliminary meeting at Chimoio. He final meeting was to be held in Beira. This was just a meeting of the commanders and the fighters. After this meeting, we were told that we would finalise issues in Beira. A driver was dispatched to go Tembwe and take Sipho Ncube. Even some field commanders were invited to this meeting. We went with them to this meeting in Beira. We thought we were going to find solutions to our challenges in Zanu. Unknown to us, the Zanu leadership had made up its mind.
SM: What do you mean?
Tondlana: This Beira meeting was just a decoy. The Zanu leaders had made up their minds to arrest the Zanla commanders in Zipa. They could not arrest us in our camps because we were popular with the fighters. So the idea was to take us away from the fighters and Frelimo would assist the Zanu leaders.
When we got to Beira, Mugabe gave the opening speech. He used a polite way of saying mumusangano mune vanhu vapanduka. Mugabe then said, we are breaking for lunch. He instructed that Zipa commanders were to use one exit door. The High Command which was in Zambian prisons and members of the Central Committee were to use another door.
Once we got out through the exit door, we were arrested by Frelimo soldiers who were armed. We were put in a truck and were taken to Karidoso Hotel. We were kept there under heavy guard by Frelimo.
SM: Do you remember some of the comrades who were also arrested?
Tondlana: There was myself, Muchechetere, Chaitezvi, Webster Gwauya and others. We were 25 in total. There were only two female comrades. One of them later became Muchechetere's wife. I want you to take note of something here. Dzino was arrested briefly but was later released. It later turned out that Tongo wanted to use Dzino to go and silence fighters at the different camps. Tongo had spent two years in prison in Zambia and these new fighters didn't know him. These new recruits didn't know many in the Zanu leadership. For example when Mugabe was taken to Teresera Base, he would take his plate vachinomira muqueue just like everyone else. The recruits couldn't recognise him and no one had told them who he was. It was only after we arrived from Mboroma that we started educating our recruits about our leaders. VaMugabe would come to the camps once in a while, like I remember one time he came to Chimoio and we introduced him to the fighters.
SM: Let's go to that hotel where you were under heavy guard.
Tondlana: I need to tell you that Rex Nhongo was the overall commander of Zipa, but he was also not arrested. We spent about five days at the hotel. We were then flown to the Mozambican border with Tanzania. It was more like kachitsuwa. No one up to this point has explained to us why we had been rounded up.
After independence, others went to Number 88 Manica to plead with Zanu kuti tiregerereiwo, but I said I am not going to plead to anybody because I didn't do anything wrong. I am convinced that the level of understanding of the revolution differed. The winner does not only take it all. The winner tells the story.
What is am saying is, after they arrested us, vana Tongo had the opportunity to tell the fighters their side of the story. We couldn't defend ourselves. If we had the opportunity we would refute the claims that we were sellouts. Disagreements are not equal to being a sell-out. My understanding of a sell-out is that he or she is someone who stands in the way of a revolution, someone who diverts or impedes. Differences in approach or ideas does not make me a sellout. Ukanditi sell-out ndinochema.
SM: You were not a sellout?
Tondlana: I am an ultra-revolutionary. That's why up to this day I am calling for Zanu-PF to have the Liberation Fighters' Wing just like the Women's and Youths Leagues. I have been calling for the party to set up the Chitepo College. Wampua College after I left was later called Chitepo College.
SM: Let's go back to your arrest. What happened after you were taken to the border between Mozambique and Tanzania?
Tondlana: We stayed there and practically we had nothing to do. No means of communication. Nothing. The only thing we could do was kuchera mbeva. Ini handidye mbeva but ndaidzichera zvakaoma. In 1978, we were then joined by another group that comprised people like Rugare Gumbo, Crispen Mandizvidza, Hamadziripi and others. These comrades had their own misunderstand with the leadership. We were arrested in January 1977 and this group joined us in 1978. I didn't embrace these new comrades.
SM: Why?
Todhlana: I didn't look at them as my colleagues. Our orientation was different. They were not revolutionaries. They were potential bourgeoisie.
You see, the national democratic revolution is a stage of our struggle where everybody participates. The main issue here is national liberation. So both the rich and the poor participate in this national democratic revolution. The idea is kuti titore nyika yedu tigoita zvatinoda.
But I was anticipating going beyond this national democratic revolution. I wanted to transform the national democratic revolution to a socialist revolution.
SM: Don't you think you were being too idealistic?
Tondlana: When I look at it now, the situation has drastically changed. You can't put the socialist revolution on the agenda today, but back then it was the ideal thing to do.
So anyway, we were in captivity until the British sent a plane that took us to Rhodesia at independence. We were then taken to Skyline Motel. While at the motel we started discussing whether to go back to Zanu or join other parties.
Myself, I said, Zanu zvayandiramba, I go back to Zapu. So I went back to Zapu. We were taken to Gweru for military training so that we could be integrated into the national army. Word got to Gweru that we could not be integrated into the national army. It was myself, Parker Chipoyera, Tendai Pfepferere and others. We were instructed to go and see Mnangagwa. We were flown to KG6. Mnangagwa told us that we could join any arm of the government but not the armed forces.
Mnangagwa instructed me to go and see the then Minister of Transport. I was then deployed to the Harare International Airport until 1982. I later worked in other ministries in government.
SM: If you look back at the role you played and some of the things you did during the liberation struggle, like you said you killed sellouts mercilessly, do you have any regrets?
Todhlana: No, not at all. I went to war and played my part. Of course I had misunderstandings with the leadership in Mozambique in 1977 and I got arrested, but I don't regret. All that happened because people didn't know what was happening exactly. It was not vaMugabe and Tongo who orchestrated our arrest. This was a Frelimo arrangement. You remember I told you that we went for the meeting where they forced some of our comrades to go to Geneva? I told you that at that meeting they called me a KGB agent? That was Samora Machel.
The other thing, when Badza and Nhari were arrested, they were arrested by Frelimo. Those comrades were rounded by Frelimo and handed over to Tongogara.
What I am trying to tell you is that if it wasn't for Frelimo's plan, as Zanu we could have found a better way to solve our issues.
SM: But surely Frelimo could not just arrest you without conniving with your leaders?
Todhlana: Physically, Frelimo is the one that arrested us but yes our leaders were behind the plan. Our charge was insubordination – that you are called by the leader of the party in Geneva and you refuse to go. I believe that this charge of insubordination actually came from Samora Machel. He is the one who advised our leaders. I think he agreed with leaders like Tongo to arrest us…You know when Tongo died, I celebrated.
SM: Why?
Todhlana: I said to myself, vaMugabe will not breathe a sigh of relief because dai taenda kumusha tina Tongo, this was going to be another Idi Amin. This was going to be another Idi Amin. In my thinking ingadai kusina Mugabe izvozvi. Tongo was ambitious and ruthless. I am sure he could have staged a coup de tat. Anything could have happened.
SM: But Todhlana, this was a fierce fighter who was loved by many comrades?
Todhlana: Kuti fierce fighter ndiko kuti chii? (laughs). Remember I said he was popular kumacamps and not kuwar front. This is my own understanding and my own projection. The way I knew Tongo, dai independence yakasvika tichinaye, possibly dai vaMugabe kusisina.
SM: Are you not saying all this against Tongo because you are bitter he got you arrested in 1977?
Todhlana: Bitter about what? I have no bad feeling against anybody. I remember around the 1980s, some people would say vanaDavie vakatengesa. I would ask such people, do you really understand what happened? Kutengesa how? Don't just sing a song yausingazive who composed it and kuti malyrics ayo anoti chii.
There was difference of approach and difference of opinion, full stop. I never did anything to favour varungu. That is being a sellout to me. But like I told you, the one who wins in a contest tells the story.
In this interview with our team comprising Munyaradzi Huni and Tendai Manzvanzvike, Todhlana who boasts of a Degree in Political Science and Political Administration from the University of Zimbabwe speaks about how his ideas gave birth to the Wampua College in Mozambique. He speaks about the clash between the Zanu leaders and their Zanla commanders as they prepared for the Geneva Conference, leading to his arrest in 1977.
Read on …
SM: Comrade, can you tell us briefly about Zipa?
Todhlana: We had to go into Zipa because we were told by the Front Line States that if you want to start the war, Zipra and Zanla have to unite. The other instruction was that we don't want vanaMugabe, vanaNkomo and other leaders messing up with Zipa. They must keep out of it.
While this was happening, as Zipra we continued calling for the release of our leaders from prisons in Lusaka. Remember some of the Zanu leaders had been arrested after the death of Chitepo. Unfortunately, no one was listening to us.
Preparations for the Geneva Conference started. It was suggested that if possible Zanu and Zapu should form one organisation to go to Geneva. The Front Lines States were saying the Zanu and Zapu positions were not very different so we were supposed to unite. This is when the Patriotic Front was formed. Just for the purpose of attending the Geneva Conference.
As freedom fighters, under Zipa we were invited to Geneva. However, by this time, the Zipra comrades had already pulled out of Zipa. Even some Zipra comrades we had deployed at the war front, they had left. It was now Zipa in name, but as Zanla we were still making efforts to have our Zipra comrades back.
I remember Report Mphoko was the Zapu representative in Maputo. We had a meeting with him saying "Report, why don't you impress upon your comrades, Mangena and others to come back to Zipa?" We also told him that Geneva was going to be a waste of time. As freedom fighters we were supposed to continue the war.
SM: Why were you convinced that nothing would come out of the Geneva Conference?
Todhlana: The war had stopped from around 1974 until the time of détente. It was now 1976 and there was no war. The Smith regime was not feeling any pinch or anything. There was nothing to motivate them to talk to us. We were supposed to hit them hard enough, so that they could seek audience from us. Taifanirwa kumborova varungu stereki. This was our position.
On the other hand we continued saying, anyone who wanted to engage us as the Zipra component in Zipa, first talk about releasing our leaders who were in Zambian prisons. We said take our leaders from the prisons and take them to Geneva. These are the people you are supposed to talk to, not us. Or take vanaMugabe not us. Isusu we want to fight.
So some comrades went to Geneva, but apparently, vana Nkomo from Zapu had their commanders, like Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Masuku and others who were the Zipra component of Zipa. The Zanla component in Zipa had refused to go the Geneva. We refused. So Nkomo and his commanders were representing Zapu and from Zanu there was Mugabe and others, but with no commanders. Mugabe had been joined by Zanu comrades who had been released from Zambian prisons, like Tongogara and others.
While in Geneva, some journalists provoked a situation. They asked Mugabe kuti we can see vaNkomo with his commanders, where are your commanders? VaMugabe defended himself saying ndinana Tongogara and others, but this was not accepted zvichinzi, these people were in jail in Zambia. We want Zanla commanders under Zipa who were executing the war. These were journalists provoking vaMugabe. This got into the minds of our Zanu leaders and the commanders who had been released from prisons in Zambia. So they sent Kangai to Maputo to come and meet us. His task was to persuade us to go to Geneva. He came and spoke to us and we told him that there was no reason for us to go to Geneva. We repeated that varungu hatisati tavarova enough for them to agree to negotiate with us. We told him that Geneva was just an exercise in futility. We said imi continue talking nevarungu isu we intensify the war. We said our intensification of the war would result in real negotiations. Kangai went back to Geneva empty handed. VaMugabe then sent Rugare Gumbo. He came and told us that kwanzi naShef huyai. We told him that our response was the same as we had given to Kangai. We are not coming. Rugare went back to Geneva with the same message. Then came iye mbune Tongo saying kwanzi navaMugabe ini sacommander wenyu ndiuye kuzokutorai. We held a meeting with Tongo and told him the same message. We told him that our focus was on the armed struggle. We told him that hondo had just resumed in April 1976 after yamira from December 1974. The war has just resumed. Geneva is just a gimmick yevarungu. So Tongo went back to Geneva empty handed.
After Tongo had left, we were summoned by Samora Machel. We went for the meeting and he was lecturing to us saying "macomrades you lack experience. In politics there is time to fight and time to negotiate. How many revolutions dzamakanzwa dzekuti soldiers ended vava in the capital city after over-running the enemy? In every situation you end up at the negotiating table. What do you lose when you talk?"
Zvino tangoti tuzu kuburitsa maziso. Samora pointed at me and said, "iwe, you are a KBG agent." I could not understand what he was talking about. He said stop all this stubbornness. He ordered us to choose a team of five commanders who were to go to Geneva. He made it very clear that this was an order and not for negotiation. We had no option because we were in Mozambique and Samora was our host.
SM: So who are the commanders you chose?
Tondlana: We chose Dzino, Gwauya, Rex Nhongo, Elias Hondo. I can't remember the fifth one. We were told to remain behind to intensify the war. But personally, I didn't play a big role in the intensification of the war. I had a special task.
SM: What was this special task?
Tondlana: Remember I told you that I received my military training in the Soviet Union? While in Soviet Union I was reading a lot about Marxism and Leninism. I also read a lot about revolutions across the globe. So when I arrived in Mozambique from Mboroma in Zambia, I was appointed as the commander of Chibavava Camp. I was not a member of the Zipa command. While at Chibavava my deputy was Mark Dube. Joice Mujuru was my third in command. There were several other camps around like Nyadzonya, Doroi and so on.
While at Chibavava I noticed that one of the comrades who was really interested in Marxism and Leninism was Dzino. I could see that we had differences but akanga ari mumwe wangu panyaya yeMarxism and Leninism. One day I left Chibavava Camp and went to Chimoio where Dzino was based. I then asked him kuti why don't we start an ideological college to teach our fighters? I said through this college lets transform our revolution from being a democratic national bourgeoisie revolution yekuti nyika yedu isununguke, yekuti vanhu vatema vazvitonge. I said I think we should go a step further and establish a socialist revolution. Dzino quickly understood me. He asked me what I had in mind. I told him lets establish this school at Chimoio and select comrades, especially those who had gone up to Form Four to be the students. He agreed to my ideas. Around February to April 1976, I was given the greenlight to establish the college and I coined it as the Wampua College. Wampua was a name that had been given to a college in 1922 in China when the Chinese Communist Party was formed. Most teachers at this college were from Soviet Union teaching communism. Dzino assisted me to pick some comrades who had the potential to come and be part of the team.
SM: Who are some of these comrades?
Tondlana: Happison Muchechetere, Basopo Mupangara, Chaitezvi and others. But all these comrades I didn't know much about their capacity. Dzino knew them well because he had trained some of them at Mgagao. After assembling this team, we started teaching our students. This college takaivaka nehuswa nemapango. We actually sat down to compile the syllabus and the books required. But much of the work, taiita from our heads. We would get books from wherever we could.
SM: What exactly where you teaching the cadres at this college?
Tondlana: We were introducing the cadres to the concepts of Marxism and Leninism. We would tell the cadres that we look forward that our revolution would transform from being national democratic – just to free ourselves from the foreign yoke. We told them that this revolution would produce a capitalist state. We told them that we wanted a socialist revolution, as was in China, Soviet Union and son on. Our idea was that we take advantage of these socialist countries that were supporting us to skip the capitalist state and go straight into socialism. This is what we were teaching the cadres. This is where I told you earlier on that I wanted to multiply myself a million times. Everybody to think like Davie.
However, I didn't stay for long at this college. In August 1976, after the death of one of the members of the Zipa High Command, Kaguri who was the director for supplies, I was appointed to replace him. I refused to take up the post. I told Dzino and Rex Nhongo that there was no need for me to be moved from the college. They however insisted and I was ordered to leave Wampua College. I left the college with a grain of salt. I was enjoying what I was doing at the college.
SM: We hear that you were later arrested. Tell us why and how?
Tondlana: Yes, I was arrested in 1977. After the Geneva Conference, the comrades came back. Our leaders now knew the influential role yaDzino. They tried to dispatch him to Europe to mobilise resources for the party. They wanted to do this so that they could come kumacamps Dzino asiko. Dzino refused to go. Dzino knew that these leaders were up to something since they had to use Samora to force them to attend the Geneva Conference. As we were refusing to go to Geneva, our leaders said we had defied their orders. We were labelled sevanhu vapunduka. So when they were preparing to come back from Geneva, Dzino was assigned to go to Europe. They knew of his influential role.
When the team arrived from Geneva, Tongo came to Chimoio to organise meetings. We had about two to three meetings with Tongo, but we could see there was tension. Yanga yava tension inobatika. Terrible tension. You know Tongo was huge and he had these big eyes.
To be continued next week
SM: Yeah, even from pictures he looks quite frightening.
Todhlana: But I had misgivings with Tongo. In 1973, Zanu used to have bi-annual conferences in Zambia. After every two years, there would be an elective conference. I didn't attend this particular bi-annual conference but I heard from many who attended that conference that the way it was run was unheard of. Apparently, before this conference the other conferences were attended by povo in Zambia. The commanders did not attend such conferences.
But this was now 1973 and we had started the war in 1972, commanders were asked to attend the conference. When they came they participated in terms of voting kuti vaipinda mudare reChimurenga ndivanani. Most of these commanders didn't know much about the party leadership and when they were told to vote, who do you think they voted for? They came up with this Bereka Mwana Concept. Munhu aiyenda kunomira kumashure kwemunhu that he or she supported. We are told that vanaTongo would direct the fighters kuti iwe enda unomira kumashure kwemunhu uyo and uyo.
Remember Tongo was very popular with the forces and they did what he told them to do. Tongo was popular not because he was good hearted or that he was a good planner. He was popular because he was always with the fighters. Ainge ainesu. Kutraining, it was Tongo, kuwar front it was Tongo.
You know William Ndangana was the chief of defence while Tongo came second as chief of operations. This was before 1973. The tables were then turned when Tongo became chief of defence. William Ndangana went to foreign affairs. The fighters didn't know Ndangana so they supported Tongo. Ndangana never visited us at the war front and as fighters we didn't know him even though he was chief of defence. This is how Tongo took over the reins of the defense portfolio. This is what I heard and from that perspective I was not happy.
Another thing was the death of Badza and Nhari. Following this conference, things were not well in Zanu. There was some measure of tension. Those who were preponderant before this conference were the Manyikas. They held most of the influencial posts in Zanu. Chairman Chitepo was a Manyika, Mutambanengwe and others were all Manyikas. MaZezuru nemaKaranga vakanga vari vashoma. Now in 1973, people like Rugare Gumbo got into Dare ReChimurenga. He was coming from school in Canada. Who voted him? Aimuziva ndiani? Ko Kumbira Kangai apinda chirudzii? These were activists who had been turned into Zanu representatives in countries where they were studying. How did they find themselves into Dare?
SM: How did they maneuver?
Tondlana: This is the million-dollar question. Gumbo and Kangai came at the same time. My suspicion is that it was Tongo who was manipulating the system. Rugare Gumbo is Karanga and Tongo was a Karanga. Kangai was half-Manyika and half-Karanga. Handiti aiva wekuBuhera? This is my suspicion. I however, don't have concrete evidence that this is what exactly happened.
SM: Let's go back to the story of your arrest.
Todhlana: After Geneva Conference flopped, everybody came back. We held meetings with Tongo as commanders. During the meetings I suggested that the Zanla High Command should change. I was making my contribution during discussions. Tongo vakagara apo. We were discussing. I suggested that lets increase the number of the people in the High Command from the current 18 to 24 or more. I said this would increase the efficiency of the High Command. As I was suggesting this, I had something behind my mind.
SM: What was that?
Tondlana: I was saying in my mind, I don't hold in high esteem members of High Command yaTongo. Some of them were semi-illiterate.
SM: Like who?
Tondlana: Like Joseph Chimurenga. Rex Nhongo was Standard Six? Elias Hondo, I think Grade Three? Chinamaropa, Chauke like the whole shoot of them. None of them could boost kuti ndakaenda kuchikoro. Even iye Tongo had gone Form 2. I could see that these comrades could not embrace and understand the ideology that I wanted to push.
My wish was to take the commander from Tete Province into the High Command, then commander from Gaza province, commander from Chibavava, commander from Nyadzonya and others to them six. I knew all these comrades had passed through Wampua College. So I wanted the number of the High Command to be increased not that they were few but because I underrated them.
SM: Don't you think you were being over-ambitious?
Tondlana: Hooo, that's your judgement?
SM: No, I am just asking. We want to know because look you had a history of coming from Zipra. Now you wanted to change things in Zanla High Command. Weren't you being too ambitious?
Tondlana: (laughs) I really don't know. So after this discussion, Rex held me by the hand. He led me into a nearby orchard. He then said; "Davie, I appreciate what you want to do. I really appreciate what you are trying to do, but Davie you are better off fighting from within." He then said; "food for thought." He walked away.
I later realized that Rex was giving me a warning that Davie you are better of fighting from within meaning usadzingwe from Zanu. So the message was play it cool. Lie low.
SM: Why was Rex Nhongo giving you this advice?
Todhlana: Rex was my cousin brother. We come from the same area. Takasangana kuhondo tikazivana. So we established a good relationship. He also knew sincerely that Davie vanoda zverevolution. His message was usadzingwa from Zanu.
SM: Is there any other person who was in support of your idea?
Tondlana: I never sold it to anybody. I just spoke about it in that meeting. This was a preliminary meeting at Chimoio. He final meeting was to be held in Beira. This was just a meeting of the commanders and the fighters. After this meeting, we were told that we would finalise issues in Beira. A driver was dispatched to go Tembwe and take Sipho Ncube. Even some field commanders were invited to this meeting. We went with them to this meeting in Beira. We thought we were going to find solutions to our challenges in Zanu. Unknown to us, the Zanu leadership had made up its mind.
SM: What do you mean?
Tondlana: This Beira meeting was just a decoy. The Zanu leaders had made up their minds to arrest the Zanla commanders in Zipa. They could not arrest us in our camps because we were popular with the fighters. So the idea was to take us away from the fighters and Frelimo would assist the Zanu leaders.
When we got to Beira, Mugabe gave the opening speech. He used a polite way of saying mumusangano mune vanhu vapanduka. Mugabe then said, we are breaking for lunch. He instructed that Zipa commanders were to use one exit door. The High Command which was in Zambian prisons and members of the Central Committee were to use another door.
Once we got out through the exit door, we were arrested by Frelimo soldiers who were armed. We were put in a truck and were taken to Karidoso Hotel. We were kept there under heavy guard by Frelimo.
SM: Do you remember some of the comrades who were also arrested?
Tondlana: There was myself, Muchechetere, Chaitezvi, Webster Gwauya and others. We were 25 in total. There were only two female comrades. One of them later became Muchechetere's wife. I want you to take note of something here. Dzino was arrested briefly but was later released. It later turned out that Tongo wanted to use Dzino to go and silence fighters at the different camps. Tongo had spent two years in prison in Zambia and these new fighters didn't know him. These new recruits didn't know many in the Zanu leadership. For example when Mugabe was taken to Teresera Base, he would take his plate vachinomira muqueue just like everyone else. The recruits couldn't recognise him and no one had told them who he was. It was only after we arrived from Mboroma that we started educating our recruits about our leaders. VaMugabe would come to the camps once in a while, like I remember one time he came to Chimoio and we introduced him to the fighters.
SM: Let's go to that hotel where you were under heavy guard.
Tondlana: I need to tell you that Rex Nhongo was the overall commander of Zipa, but he was also not arrested. We spent about five days at the hotel. We were then flown to the Mozambican border with Tanzania. It was more like kachitsuwa. No one up to this point has explained to us why we had been rounded up.
After independence, others went to Number 88 Manica to plead with Zanu kuti tiregerereiwo, but I said I am not going to plead to anybody because I didn't do anything wrong. I am convinced that the level of understanding of the revolution differed. The winner does not only take it all. The winner tells the story.
What is am saying is, after they arrested us, vana Tongo had the opportunity to tell the fighters their side of the story. We couldn't defend ourselves. If we had the opportunity we would refute the claims that we were sellouts. Disagreements are not equal to being a sell-out. My understanding of a sell-out is that he or she is someone who stands in the way of a revolution, someone who diverts or impedes. Differences in approach or ideas does not make me a sellout. Ukanditi sell-out ndinochema.
SM: You were not a sellout?
Tondlana: I am an ultra-revolutionary. That's why up to this day I am calling for Zanu-PF to have the Liberation Fighters' Wing just like the Women's and Youths Leagues. I have been calling for the party to set up the Chitepo College. Wampua College after I left was later called Chitepo College.
SM: Let's go back to your arrest. What happened after you were taken to the border between Mozambique and Tanzania?
Tondlana: We stayed there and practically we had nothing to do. No means of communication. Nothing. The only thing we could do was kuchera mbeva. Ini handidye mbeva but ndaidzichera zvakaoma. In 1978, we were then joined by another group that comprised people like Rugare Gumbo, Crispen Mandizvidza, Hamadziripi and others. These comrades had their own misunderstand with the leadership. We were arrested in January 1977 and this group joined us in 1978. I didn't embrace these new comrades.
SM: Why?
Todhlana: I didn't look at them as my colleagues. Our orientation was different. They were not revolutionaries. They were potential bourgeoisie.
You see, the national democratic revolution is a stage of our struggle where everybody participates. The main issue here is national liberation. So both the rich and the poor participate in this national democratic revolution. The idea is kuti titore nyika yedu tigoita zvatinoda.
But I was anticipating going beyond this national democratic revolution. I wanted to transform the national democratic revolution to a socialist revolution.
SM: Don't you think you were being too idealistic?
Tondlana: When I look at it now, the situation has drastically changed. You can't put the socialist revolution on the agenda today, but back then it was the ideal thing to do.
So anyway, we were in captivity until the British sent a plane that took us to Rhodesia at independence. We were then taken to Skyline Motel. While at the motel we started discussing whether to go back to Zanu or join other parties.
Myself, I said, Zanu zvayandiramba, I go back to Zapu. So I went back to Zapu. We were taken to Gweru for military training so that we could be integrated into the national army. Word got to Gweru that we could not be integrated into the national army. It was myself, Parker Chipoyera, Tendai Pfepferere and others. We were instructed to go and see Mnangagwa. We were flown to KG6. Mnangagwa told us that we could join any arm of the government but not the armed forces.
Mnangagwa instructed me to go and see the then Minister of Transport. I was then deployed to the Harare International Airport until 1982. I later worked in other ministries in government.
SM: If you look back at the role you played and some of the things you did during the liberation struggle, like you said you killed sellouts mercilessly, do you have any regrets?
Todhlana: No, not at all. I went to war and played my part. Of course I had misunderstandings with the leadership in Mozambique in 1977 and I got arrested, but I don't regret. All that happened because people didn't know what was happening exactly. It was not vaMugabe and Tongo who orchestrated our arrest. This was a Frelimo arrangement. You remember I told you that we went for the meeting where they forced some of our comrades to go to Geneva? I told you that at that meeting they called me a KGB agent? That was Samora Machel.
The other thing, when Badza and Nhari were arrested, they were arrested by Frelimo. Those comrades were rounded by Frelimo and handed over to Tongogara.
What I am trying to tell you is that if it wasn't for Frelimo's plan, as Zanu we could have found a better way to solve our issues.
SM: But surely Frelimo could not just arrest you without conniving with your leaders?
Todhlana: Physically, Frelimo is the one that arrested us but yes our leaders were behind the plan. Our charge was insubordination – that you are called by the leader of the party in Geneva and you refuse to go. I believe that this charge of insubordination actually came from Samora Machel. He is the one who advised our leaders. I think he agreed with leaders like Tongo to arrest us…You know when Tongo died, I celebrated.
SM: Why?
Todhlana: I said to myself, vaMugabe will not breathe a sigh of relief because dai taenda kumusha tina Tongo, this was going to be another Idi Amin. This was going to be another Idi Amin. In my thinking ingadai kusina Mugabe izvozvi. Tongo was ambitious and ruthless. I am sure he could have staged a coup de tat. Anything could have happened.
SM: But Todhlana, this was a fierce fighter who was loved by many comrades?
Todhlana: Kuti fierce fighter ndiko kuti chii? (laughs). Remember I said he was popular kumacamps and not kuwar front. This is my own understanding and my own projection. The way I knew Tongo, dai independence yakasvika tichinaye, possibly dai vaMugabe kusisina.
SM: Are you not saying all this against Tongo because you are bitter he got you arrested in 1977?
Todhlana: Bitter about what? I have no bad feeling against anybody. I remember around the 1980s, some people would say vanaDavie vakatengesa. I would ask such people, do you really understand what happened? Kutengesa how? Don't just sing a song yausingazive who composed it and kuti malyrics ayo anoti chii.
There was difference of approach and difference of opinion, full stop. I never did anything to favour varungu. That is being a sellout to me. But like I told you, the one who wins in a contest tells the story.
Source - zimpapers
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