News / National
How Chamisa, MDC Alliance lost it
08 Aug 2018 at 06:29hrs | Views
Despite his controversial ascendance to power, Nelson Chamisa's assumption of the reins in the main opposition camp generated excitement within his party, the MDC-T, as party members placed their hopes in him following the death of founding leader Morgan Tsvangirai in February this year.
An analysis of how he fared during the just-ended election and his reaction to his electoral loss indicates that the hope and trust placed in him by opposition members were misplaced.
Chamisa's rise to the MDC-T faction's leadership coincided with President-elect Emmerson Mnangagwa's opening up of the democratic space in Zimbabwe.
Chamisa was excited
It was as if the new dispensation was waiting just for him to freely address opposition members even in provinces such as Mashonaland, which the opposition considered no-go areas, something Tsvangirai was denied in his 18 years at the helm of the MDC-T.
The freedom ushered in by the new political dispensation went to Chamisa's head as it seems his main objective became to set a new record of holding the highest number of campaign meetings during the pre-election time. Unfortunately, there was no sound message to win the hearts of the electorate.
Indeed, he set a record by holding over 80 rallies across the country, which even former President Robert Mugabe never achieved in any single campaign period during his 37 years at the helm of Zanu-PF. Chamisa got carried away by the desire to chalk the highest number of rallies to the extent of forgetting that the electorate values candidates' promises and track records. In this regard, he scored dismally as he had no record except a ministerial position during the 2009 to 2013 inclusive government compared to his main opponent, President Mnangagwa.
Despite these glaring shortcomings, his Alliance partners did not raise so much as a finger to correct him as some of them, such as Tendai Biti of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and Professor Welshman Ncube of MDC were looking up to his possible win to salvage their political careers which had already been consigned to the political village heath since the MDC split of 2005 and 2014. He rode roughshod over fellow partners and refused to hear them out regarding their concerns such as the allocation of constituency seats. Chamisa even seized seats which had been allocated to other Alliance parties.
At some point Chamisa questioned why President Mnangagwa was not vigorously campaigning as he was doing, opting instead to concentrate on economic issues. Surprised by the ruling party's strategy, they ended up accusing Zanu-PF of plotting to rig the election to explain the party's relaxed but confident approach to campaigning.
Chamisa and his colleagues laughed that the President would not garner any seats in the Mashonaland provinces where they claimed he was not popular.
They mocked the First Lady, Auxillia Mnangagwa's philanthropic work in various provinces targeting the elderly and the less privileged. Although this was under the banner of her Angel of Hope Foundation, she demonstrated to Chamisa that the people of Zimbabwe, while aspiring for the modern life of village airports and spaghetti roads which he promised, rural folk had more basic and pressing needs such as food and clinics. She mingled with them, cooked for them and shared meals with them, endearing herself to them and her party.
While President Mnangagwa was pushing for economic recovery to improve people's lives, she was doing her bit to campaign for her party in her own unique way. Chamisa was stuck in the old ways of canvassing for the electorate's support through criticising one's opponents.
One would have thought that Chamisa had learnt from his predecessor's mistakes but it seems he learnt nothing from Tsvangirai's political gaffes.
Tsvangirai called for sanctions against Zimbabwe in the vain hope of pushing Zimbabweans to rise up against their Government thereby allowing him a back door entry to power. So powerful was Tsvangirai that before the West carried out its annual review of the sanctions list, it would consult him first. He could tell them who he wanted retained or removed off the sanctions list.
Chamisa, Biti and others travelled to America in December last year where they, among other things, lobbied for the extension of the illegal sanctions against the people of Zimbabwe. Although some Zimbabweans are persuaded to support the opposition, they would not support the person who deliberately engineers their suffering for his own political ends. For this reason the conceited Chamisa was severely punished by the electorate.
Perhaps the masterstroke of his campaign, which was built using bricks of different types of political miscalculations, was his desperate decision to accept funding from the former first family, the Mugabes, to oil his campaign. For the Mugabes, supporting Chamisa was meant to get back at President Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF and revive the former First Lady, Grace Mugabe's political career which was nipped in its nascent but eventful stages. The funding, which Chamisa used to rent some billboard space and to meet campaign obligations, was a palm-greaser to open the door for Grace Mugabe to be his deputy in the event that he won the July 30 elections.
This was his major undoing as it drove a wedge between him and other partners who questioned the wisdom of associating with the Mugabes whom they had fought for 18 years?
On this one Chamisa plunged to the depths of political desperation. Some of his faction's supporters were equally dumbfounded and the Alliance's failure to win a two thirds parliamentary majority is therefore not a surprise.
As a result of Chamisa's pig-headed decisions, President Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF ran rings around him electorally. As if this was not enough, he is also doggedly opposing his partners' advice not to contest his loss which has further divided the Alliance. This has seen none of them standing with him as he addresses the media over his drubbing.
When the dust has settled and the media which are feting him like some head of state have gone back to their offices, he is likely to realise that high rally turn-outs do not necessarily translate to votes as it is now emerging that most of those supporters were not registered voters.
This year's election is also likely to teach him that it is not the number of rallies that matters but one's strategy. Being good with chiShona language in addressing rallies does not necessarily mean popularity, he has found out.
His planned court case to contest the elections results, which is marred by lack of irrefutable evidence and is at the mercy of unpaid election agents who are reportedly withholding the V11 forms, is likely to teach him to invest in election agents instead of motorcades and all manner of unnecessary fancy showiness. Overall, Chamisa has learnt that the Zanu-PF mobilisation juggernaut can only be taken for granted at one's own political detriment.
An analysis of how he fared during the just-ended election and his reaction to his electoral loss indicates that the hope and trust placed in him by opposition members were misplaced.
Chamisa's rise to the MDC-T faction's leadership coincided with President-elect Emmerson Mnangagwa's opening up of the democratic space in Zimbabwe.
Chamisa was excited
It was as if the new dispensation was waiting just for him to freely address opposition members even in provinces such as Mashonaland, which the opposition considered no-go areas, something Tsvangirai was denied in his 18 years at the helm of the MDC-T.
The freedom ushered in by the new political dispensation went to Chamisa's head as it seems his main objective became to set a new record of holding the highest number of campaign meetings during the pre-election time. Unfortunately, there was no sound message to win the hearts of the electorate.
Indeed, he set a record by holding over 80 rallies across the country, which even former President Robert Mugabe never achieved in any single campaign period during his 37 years at the helm of Zanu-PF. Chamisa got carried away by the desire to chalk the highest number of rallies to the extent of forgetting that the electorate values candidates' promises and track records. In this regard, he scored dismally as he had no record except a ministerial position during the 2009 to 2013 inclusive government compared to his main opponent, President Mnangagwa.
Despite these glaring shortcomings, his Alliance partners did not raise so much as a finger to correct him as some of them, such as Tendai Biti of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and Professor Welshman Ncube of MDC were looking up to his possible win to salvage their political careers which had already been consigned to the political village heath since the MDC split of 2005 and 2014. He rode roughshod over fellow partners and refused to hear them out regarding their concerns such as the allocation of constituency seats. Chamisa even seized seats which had been allocated to other Alliance parties.
At some point Chamisa questioned why President Mnangagwa was not vigorously campaigning as he was doing, opting instead to concentrate on economic issues. Surprised by the ruling party's strategy, they ended up accusing Zanu-PF of plotting to rig the election to explain the party's relaxed but confident approach to campaigning.
Chamisa and his colleagues laughed that the President would not garner any seats in the Mashonaland provinces where they claimed he was not popular.
They mocked the First Lady, Auxillia Mnangagwa's philanthropic work in various provinces targeting the elderly and the less privileged. Although this was under the banner of her Angel of Hope Foundation, she demonstrated to Chamisa that the people of Zimbabwe, while aspiring for the modern life of village airports and spaghetti roads which he promised, rural folk had more basic and pressing needs such as food and clinics. She mingled with them, cooked for them and shared meals with them, endearing herself to them and her party.
One would have thought that Chamisa had learnt from his predecessor's mistakes but it seems he learnt nothing from Tsvangirai's political gaffes.
Tsvangirai called for sanctions against Zimbabwe in the vain hope of pushing Zimbabweans to rise up against their Government thereby allowing him a back door entry to power. So powerful was Tsvangirai that before the West carried out its annual review of the sanctions list, it would consult him first. He could tell them who he wanted retained or removed off the sanctions list.
Chamisa, Biti and others travelled to America in December last year where they, among other things, lobbied for the extension of the illegal sanctions against the people of Zimbabwe. Although some Zimbabweans are persuaded to support the opposition, they would not support the person who deliberately engineers their suffering for his own political ends. For this reason the conceited Chamisa was severely punished by the electorate.
Perhaps the masterstroke of his campaign, which was built using bricks of different types of political miscalculations, was his desperate decision to accept funding from the former first family, the Mugabes, to oil his campaign. For the Mugabes, supporting Chamisa was meant to get back at President Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF and revive the former First Lady, Grace Mugabe's political career which was nipped in its nascent but eventful stages. The funding, which Chamisa used to rent some billboard space and to meet campaign obligations, was a palm-greaser to open the door for Grace Mugabe to be his deputy in the event that he won the July 30 elections.
This was his major undoing as it drove a wedge between him and other partners who questioned the wisdom of associating with the Mugabes whom they had fought for 18 years?
On this one Chamisa plunged to the depths of political desperation. Some of his faction's supporters were equally dumbfounded and the Alliance's failure to win a two thirds parliamentary majority is therefore not a surprise.
As a result of Chamisa's pig-headed decisions, President Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF ran rings around him electorally. As if this was not enough, he is also doggedly opposing his partners' advice not to contest his loss which has further divided the Alliance. This has seen none of them standing with him as he addresses the media over his drubbing.
When the dust has settled and the media which are feting him like some head of state have gone back to their offices, he is likely to realise that high rally turn-outs do not necessarily translate to votes as it is now emerging that most of those supporters were not registered voters.
This year's election is also likely to teach him that it is not the number of rallies that matters but one's strategy. Being good with chiShona language in addressing rallies does not necessarily mean popularity, he has found out.
His planned court case to contest the elections results, which is marred by lack of irrefutable evidence and is at the mercy of unpaid election agents who are reportedly withholding the V11 forms, is likely to teach him to invest in election agents instead of motorcades and all manner of unnecessary fancy showiness. Overall, Chamisa has learnt that the Zanu-PF mobilisation juggernaut can only be taken for granted at one's own political detriment.
Source - chronicle
