Opinion / Columnist
Caveats and opportunities of secret Zanu-PF, MDC talks
31 Jul 2011 at 09:59hrs | Views
There is every reason to worry whenever there are talks between Zanu-PF and its opponents and the reported secret talks with the two MDC formations (The Zimbabwean 30/07/11) are no exception. The experience of the Global Political Agreement and those signed before it provides important caveats.
Without external pressure, it has never been possible to secure an agreement with Zanu-PF. For instance, in 1979 the Frontline States in particular Mozambique and Zambia exerted pressure on Zanu-PF and Zapu because of the bombings of their countries by the Rhodesian regime. Edgar Tekere wrote that, "In his turn, Smith was also coming under pressure from (Apartheid) South African government to give some ground", A lifetime of Struggle, p 69. Post-apartheid South Africa was the architect and driver of the GPA.
Understandably the secret talks are said to be aimed at ridding the post-Mugabe government of partisan bureaucrats and a governance system beholden of the security forces. It is not clear how that noble objective can be achieved in secret between a few individuals who remain anonymous and unaccountable for any commitments made without public scrutiny. There is no assurance that the Soviet-style party will honour any undertakings it will make behind the scenes.
Zanu-PF has consistently shown preference for cherry-picking when it comes to agreements. For instance, so far it has been reluctant to implement some parts of the GPA or those cherries it does not like to pick such as a constitution other than the Kariba Draft, a roadmap with realistic timelines, a voters roll that is up-to-date and inclusive.
There is every reason to suspect that Zanu-PF is about to repeat what it did during the Detente of 19774-75 when it "concluded" the Unity Accord with Mozorewa's United African National Council (UANC). Edgar Tekere said: "The only way out of our dilemma was to sign up the Unity Accord, while quietly proceeding to do the opposite, and intensify the war, which was all but paralysed at this time. So we agreed to sign up to the Lusaka Accord, while quietly proceeding with our own agenda. All the movements signed, while we urged the external wing (Zanla) to intensify the war effort," Tekere said (p70).
After describing the strategy, Tekere goes on to make an important revelation that seems to have been repeated with the GPA and possibly again in future: "We called this deception Tamba Wakachenjera (Operation Deception – Be Alert). Although we did not communicate with Zapu, we were aware that they were also recruiting in the west of Zimbabwe. Nkomo is on record as saying, 'I am not going to work under that little Bishop" (the late Bishop Abel Muzorewa, president of the UANC) (p70).
Even after Lancaster House Agreement was signed in 1979, Zanu-PF did not make it easy for the 1980 elections to be run on schedule. According to Dr Joshua Nkomo's The Story of My Life, "As the evidence accumulated of terrorism and mass intimidation in the eastern provinces of the country, Lord Soames (The Governor of pre-independence Zimbabwe) summoned all the party leaders to Government House."
"He told us frankly that in certain areas intimidation was on such a scale that free and fair elections could not be conducted. I asked him to clarify this statement, and he made it clear that the offences were being committed by members of Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF party" (page206). Dr Nkomo said he raised the question of intimidation personally with Robert Mugabe. "He (Mugabe) brushed it aside, and paid no attention"(page 207).
The foregoing seeks to highlight how history repeats itself in dear Zimbabwe and the important caveats to watch for when negotiating with Zanu-PF. There is no evidence that Zanu-PF has changed since the 1970s. However, this could be a rare opportunity for a breakthrough. There are essentially two options. One is to let the secret talks run their full course and witness another Operation Deception – Be alert.
Alternatively, for want of a right name another option possibly called 'The Mashiri Option' is to get the secret talks out into the open and broaden their scope to a constitutional conference seeing that COPAC won't deliver amid talk of a negotiated constitution.
The conference would ideally be attended by leaders of all political parties and key civil society organisations and chaired by the Commonwealth Secretary General's envoy or that of the United Nations Secretary General, to ensure international pressure and oversight with observers from organisations such as SADC, the AU and the EU. Priscilla Misihairambwi's Ministry for International Cooperation would be best suited for the task of jointly organising such a conference with the Commonwealth and or the United Nations not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of Zanu-PF's repulsive dominance.
Such a constitutional conference could be a prelude to Zimbabwe's return to the Commonwealth of Nations followed by the lifting of targeted sanctions after UN supervised elections. International funding could be secured as the UN once offered to help fund elections only to be rebuffed by Zanu-PF.
To ensure delegates are not distracted by their day-to-day duties, the high-powered conference could take place in say, Mauritius with a mandate to adopt a Transitional Governing Plan which addresses the post-Mugabe era, , a draft Constitution (not the Kariba Draft), followed by UN supervised referendum and free and fair elections where the Diaspora vote will count. If the UN did that in South Sudan why not in Zimbabwe?
Reasons why The Mashiri Option has chances of success include transparency; inclusiveness; Zanu-PF's desperation and realisation of sure electoral defeat; getting assurances by the EU and AU promise to lift targeted sanctions 30 days after general elections and the peaceful transfer of power to the winning presidential candidate followed by the return of the Diaspora and becoming a member of the Commonwealth.
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©Clifford Chitupa Mashiri, Political Analyst, London, zimanalysis2009@gmail.com
Without external pressure, it has never been possible to secure an agreement with Zanu-PF. For instance, in 1979 the Frontline States in particular Mozambique and Zambia exerted pressure on Zanu-PF and Zapu because of the bombings of their countries by the Rhodesian regime. Edgar Tekere wrote that, "In his turn, Smith was also coming under pressure from (Apartheid) South African government to give some ground", A lifetime of Struggle, p 69. Post-apartheid South Africa was the architect and driver of the GPA.
Understandably the secret talks are said to be aimed at ridding the post-Mugabe government of partisan bureaucrats and a governance system beholden of the security forces. It is not clear how that noble objective can be achieved in secret between a few individuals who remain anonymous and unaccountable for any commitments made without public scrutiny. There is no assurance that the Soviet-style party will honour any undertakings it will make behind the scenes.
Zanu-PF has consistently shown preference for cherry-picking when it comes to agreements. For instance, so far it has been reluctant to implement some parts of the GPA or those cherries it does not like to pick such as a constitution other than the Kariba Draft, a roadmap with realistic timelines, a voters roll that is up-to-date and inclusive.
There is every reason to suspect that Zanu-PF is about to repeat what it did during the Detente of 19774-75 when it "concluded" the Unity Accord with Mozorewa's United African National Council (UANC). Edgar Tekere said: "The only way out of our dilemma was to sign up the Unity Accord, while quietly proceeding to do the opposite, and intensify the war, which was all but paralysed at this time. So we agreed to sign up to the Lusaka Accord, while quietly proceeding with our own agenda. All the movements signed, while we urged the external wing (Zanla) to intensify the war effort," Tekere said (p70).
After describing the strategy, Tekere goes on to make an important revelation that seems to have been repeated with the GPA and possibly again in future: "We called this deception Tamba Wakachenjera (Operation Deception – Be Alert). Although we did not communicate with Zapu, we were aware that they were also recruiting in the west of Zimbabwe. Nkomo is on record as saying, 'I am not going to work under that little Bishop" (the late Bishop Abel Muzorewa, president of the UANC) (p70).
Even after Lancaster House Agreement was signed in 1979, Zanu-PF did not make it easy for the 1980 elections to be run on schedule. According to Dr Joshua Nkomo's The Story of My Life, "As the evidence accumulated of terrorism and mass intimidation in the eastern provinces of the country, Lord Soames (The Governor of pre-independence Zimbabwe) summoned all the party leaders to Government House."
"He told us frankly that in certain areas intimidation was on such a scale that free and fair elections could not be conducted. I asked him to clarify this statement, and he made it clear that the offences were being committed by members of Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF party" (page206). Dr Nkomo said he raised the question of intimidation personally with Robert Mugabe. "He (Mugabe) brushed it aside, and paid no attention"(page 207).
The foregoing seeks to highlight how history repeats itself in dear Zimbabwe and the important caveats to watch for when negotiating with Zanu-PF. There is no evidence that Zanu-PF has changed since the 1970s. However, this could be a rare opportunity for a breakthrough. There are essentially two options. One is to let the secret talks run their full course and witness another Operation Deception – Be alert.
Alternatively, for want of a right name another option possibly called 'The Mashiri Option' is to get the secret talks out into the open and broaden their scope to a constitutional conference seeing that COPAC won't deliver amid talk of a negotiated constitution.
The conference would ideally be attended by leaders of all political parties and key civil society organisations and chaired by the Commonwealth Secretary General's envoy or that of the United Nations Secretary General, to ensure international pressure and oversight with observers from organisations such as SADC, the AU and the EU. Priscilla Misihairambwi's Ministry for International Cooperation would be best suited for the task of jointly organising such a conference with the Commonwealth and or the United Nations not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of Zanu-PF's repulsive dominance.
Such a constitutional conference could be a prelude to Zimbabwe's return to the Commonwealth of Nations followed by the lifting of targeted sanctions after UN supervised elections. International funding could be secured as the UN once offered to help fund elections only to be rebuffed by Zanu-PF.
To ensure delegates are not distracted by their day-to-day duties, the high-powered conference could take place in say, Mauritius with a mandate to adopt a Transitional Governing Plan which addresses the post-Mugabe era, , a draft Constitution (not the Kariba Draft), followed by UN supervised referendum and free and fair elections where the Diaspora vote will count. If the UN did that in South Sudan why not in Zimbabwe?
Reasons why The Mashiri Option has chances of success include transparency; inclusiveness; Zanu-PF's desperation and realisation of sure electoral defeat; getting assurances by the EU and AU promise to lift targeted sanctions 30 days after general elections and the peaceful transfer of power to the winning presidential candidate followed by the return of the Diaspora and becoming a member of the Commonwealth.
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©Clifford Chitupa Mashiri, Political Analyst, London, zimanalysis2009@gmail.com
Source - Clifford Chitupa Mashiri
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