Ex-CIO boss reveals Military Intelligence role in Baba Jukwa scandal

Former Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) Director-General Happyton Bonyongwe has revealed in his memoirs that the arrest and prosecution of individuals linked to the infamous Baba Jukwa Facebook page could have been avoided if Military Intelligence had disclosed its involvement in the saga during Joint Operations Command (JOC) meetings.

Bonyongwe's memoirs, One Among Many Others: My Contribution to the Zimbabwean Story, recount the controversial saga of Baba Jukwa, a Facebook page that leaked confidential ZANU-PF and government information, stirring political tensions. At the height of its influence, Baba Jukwa posted content alleging that then-President Robert Mugabe was gravely ill or even dead, and it leaked the identities and personal details of CIO operatives, putting their lives and families at risk.

In response to the growing threat, the CIO launched an investigation, which identified Edmund Kudzai, editor of The Sunday Mail, as the individual managing the Baba Jukwa account. According to Bonyongwe, Kudzai explained that he had taken over the page on the instructions of Military Intelligence, which had directed him to manage it after the real Baba Jukwa, supposedly based in Australia, surrendered control. However, this crucial detail was not disclosed to the CIO or JOC, leading to Kudzai's prosecution.

"Had Military Intelligence made the disclosure during the JOC meeting or soon after the Baba Jukwa saga broke out, the arrests and prosecution could have been avoided," Bonyongwe writes. He adds that the CIO’s attempts to verify Kudzai's claims with Facebook were unsuccessful, as the social media giant refused to cooperate with Zimbabwean authorities. This left Kudzai’s story, supported by Military Intelligence and a government minister, largely uncontested, eventually resulting in the charges against him being dropped.

Bonyongwe also reflects on the broader implications of the saga, highlighting the tensions between different arms of Zimbabwe’s security apparatus. He questions why Jonathan Moyo, the then-Minister of Information, approached Military Intelligence instead of the CIO, which was responsible for dealing with political threats. Mugabe himself reportedly expressed concerns about this decision, viewing it as a potential breach of protocol.

The former CIO head also hints at deeper political motivations behind the saga, recounting that George Charamba, Mugabe's spokesperson, told him that Moyo had vowed never to forgive the CIO for its role in the Baba Jukwa case. "This might suggest that other motives could have been at play behind the whole saga," Bonyongwe concludes, leaving open the possibility that internal political struggles may have influenced the handling of the case.

Despite the lack of convictions, Bonyongwe maintains that the CIO’s efforts were ultimately successful in stopping Baba Jukwa's subversive activities. However, the case remains a vivid reminder of the complexities of Zimbabwe’s political and intelligence landscape during that time, particularly as cyber threats began to emerge as a new front in political battles.