Zipra: The Sipolilo battles

The Wankie battles, which subsequently became known as the Western Front, lasted from 13 August to mid-September 1967. MK headquarters in Lusaka were able to follow events in Wankie, and when they heard of the ongoing clashes, decided to send another unit to Rhodesia to divert the enemy's attention. The plan was to attack enemy from the east, towards Sipolilo, thereby opening up second front that would place the Rhodesian forces under pressure from two sides. Msimang recalled:
It became very clear that we needed to consider the strategy. We could not send more people down the same route. I remember sitting with Oliver Tambo - I was in High Command MK, in charge of communications, and when we formed the joint Command with the ZAPS people, ZIPRA, I also went into the joint Command structure. We discussed a regrouping, and my own views were that we would only go to South Africa through Zimbabwe. There was an armed struggle taking place there, conditions were okay, but we needed to prepare a lot better than we had done in Wankie. And the preparations started and we went to the east-to Sipolilo, the Eastern Front. That was prepared for a lot better than the Western Front, than the Wankie campaign. The first reconnaissance was carried out by, I think some ANC guys including myself, and ZIPRA people. And I remember us going across, going right into Zimbabwe, and it was a godforsaken place. There was just nothing, and we went in, came back and said, Guys, ... it's clear.'

Unlike the Western Front - where MK was split into two, one group heading for South Africa to establish bases, the other remaining in Zimbabwe as support for the units that would follow-the objectives of MK's participation on the Eastern Front were not as clear-cut. According to Ralf Mzamo, the intention was to make contact with local inhabitants and train them to organise and participate in the armed struggle. The plan seemed to be to assist ZIPRA to mount attacks on the enemy forces so that a second route could be opened up. The joint ZIPRA/MK operation that subsequently became known as the Sipolilo campaign ran from December 1967 to July 1968. Three large groups of guerrillas crossed into Zimbabwe during this period.

Boston Gagarin again played a pivotal role in getting the first group across the Zambezi river in December 1967. In addition to taking the guerrillas across, his reconnaissance team had to transport 61 crates of ammunition, 10 bags of rifles and box of explosives into Rhodesia. This crossing was therefore more difficult than the August operation had been, and some arms and ammunition were lost in the process. However, this unit was better equipped than the Luthuli detachment, and communications equipment such as a Braun 12-band worldwide receiver. The crossing was made on the night of 29 December at the confluence of the Zambezi and Chewore rivers, using the same methods employed in August. RMT Ngungwana reported: A long, thick rope was tide to the raft at the other end to a tree. It was pushed into the water. A few metres from the bank five men boarded the raft. Boston swam alongside, guiding the raft by muscles power. From the river bank, we had to control the rope so that the raft did not move too fast. Guluva, one of the frogmen, came running from behind, carrying a small boat, and jump into the water with it, the boat touching the surface just before he did. But the boat could only carry three men at the time, so Guluva had to remain in the water while others crossed. Afterwards, he looked as if he had just gone for short swim in a municipal swimming pool, where the water was seven feet ...

The Pyramid Detachment, as it became known, was made up of 74 ZIPRA and 26 MK guerrillas under the command of Moffat Hadebe, a member of ZIPRA. Members including Ike Photo, Ralph Mzamo, Kenneth Mzati, Raymond Chitambo, Felix Gcayiya and Jimmy Mopedi. The unit was to confront the Rhodesian forces only three months after crossing the Zambezi river, but like the Luthuli Detachment, the guerrillas had insufficient food supplies, and we were both hungry and weary by the time the fighting began. In February 1968, another group of approximately 100 fighters crossed the Zambezi in the mountainious region between the Victoria Falls and Lake Kariba. A third group of 91 guerrillas followed in July, crossing near the border post at Chirundu and heading Southwest towards Lupane.

Jimmy Mopedi was in the first platoon from the Pyramid Detachment to set up a base in Rhodesia. Assisted by the MK commander-in-chief Joe Modise and ZAPU members who had carried out reconnaissance work, Mopedi's group was later joined by other platoons. The whole detachment was then reorganised into four platoons to facilitate the establishment of six more bases in Rhodesia. Each base had an engineering unit and reconnaissance team. Together, they reconnoitred the locations and prepared the hideouts send storage places for arms, ammunition and food.

During the first three months their radio equipment was in excellent conditions and the operators well trained, and they maintained regular contact with headquarters in Zambia. Meat was abundant, according to Mopedi, because they were able to shoot game. Reid-Daly noted that the base camps were established by a group of 125 guerrillas about 20 km apart across the floor ogre the uninhabited Zambezi Valley, and speculated that the intention was to establish a permanent infiltration route south of the escarpment. The first contact between the guerrilas and Rhodesian forces occurred on the 18 March.
As with the Luthuli Detachment during the Wankie campaign, there has been much speculation about how the Pyramid Detachment was detected. One theory is that enemy agents had infiltrated both MK and ZIPRA in Zambia and that they alerted the Rhodesian authorities to the new routes. Another possibility explanation is that, at the time, there was a tendency among the Rhodesian lliberation movements to underrate the serious need to mobilise support on the ground.

There was a pervading romanticised notion that all the liberation movements needed to do was train a few guerrillas and send them home to fire few shots in order to spark a spontaneous popular uprising against white domination by the African population. The leaders would then emerge and sweep the people to victory. Some critics believe that both ZAPU and the ANC underestimated of garnering support among the civilian population as a way of camouflaging guerrilla fighters, and made a tactical error of seeing sparsely populated Zambezi Valley as a natural infiltration route. In fact, the choice may have made it easier for the Rhodesian security forces to identify and track the insurgents.

While the argument seems persuasive seen against the lack of organised political structures in both Rhodesia and South Africa in the period immediately after UDI and the Rivonia arrests, it is difficult to reconcile with the ANC, in particular, whose leaders in exile took the business of building support extremely seriously, both in Africa and abroad. In addition, it was the very reluctance of the ANC leadership to send cadres back to South Africa after the collapse of the underground network so vital to their survival, that gave rise to the dissent in the military training camps prior to the 1967-8 campaigns. Reid-Daly, Morris, Mopedi and Msimang all concluded that the Pyramid Detachment's presence was detected by a game warden who found human spoor where non was expected.

According to Mopedi, during the two month that the cadres spent hiding out in mountains while waiting Gordon local comrades to contact them, they noticed that a road was under construction between town A and town B ( probably Kariba and Karoi). The road was a few miles from a River C ( presumably the Angwa). The guerrillas had to move to and from their base, and one of them had to left a footprint at the side of the road used by Rhodesian security forces patrols. The print was distinctive, because the Czechoslovakian boots issued to the MK guerrillas had a figure of eight on the sole and the same prints had been identified by security forces during the Wankie campaign.

The area was heavily patrolled by two Land Rovers at two-hour intervals. Within days of the telltale footprint being found, Rhodesian troops were ordered to report for duty on the 13 March. Over the next week, tracker teams, supported by helicopters and light aircraft, scoured the area from Zambezi to Sipolilo in the east, their presence blocking all escape routes into Zambia. On 18 March, the security forces found fresh spoor and followed the trail for about two kilometers to the guerrilla position. As it happened, the detachment had been experiencing major problems with it radio equipment, and communication between the platoons, as well as with headquarters, had broken down. All the main guerrilla force knew was that enemy aircraft were dropping troops about 24 miles from their position. Around 6 am on the morning of 18 March, members of detachment slipped through the enemy lines and made their way to base six to find out what was happening. They found a group of their comrades waiting and quickly organised defences.

At about 11 am the Rhodesian helicopters and aircraft began hovering overhead and signalled the position of the camp to the forces on the ground. Three hours later, scouts reported to the guerrilla commander that the Rhodesians were approaching the base. By late afternoon, the first assault had been repulsed, thanks to the guerrilla force's light machine-guns. The initial attackers were wiped out, with the exemption of two who escaped into the bush across a small stream.

But according to Mopedi, knowing that the security forces would attack again, the guerrillas laid a well-planned ambush, and inflicted further heavy casualties on the Rhodesians. Because they had been killed on open ground, it was not possible for the guerrillas to capture the arms and equipment of the dead Rhodesians, as this would have exposed them to fire from hovering helicopter. Instead, they retreated swiftly, anticipating that fighter jets would be called in to bomb the area. The battle lasted all afternoon and the guerrillas were delighted that they suffered no fatalities, according to Mopedi.

However Reid-Daly claimed that the casualties were 11 dead 'terrorist' one dead and two wounded on the Rhodesians side. The ANC also listed four MK casualties on that day.

After the battle, the detachment abandoned Base six. This first engagement with Rhodesian security forces had shown how volunerable the guerrillas were in a large group. The Pyramid Detachment had been 100 strong when it crossed into Rhodesia, but one member had been lost on the banks of Zambezi, when he accidentally shot himself while cleaning his rifle. Now the detachment split up into smaller groups of 18 to 24 members each that began making their separate ways to a new assembly point, on top of a cliff. Mopedi unit marched west first then turned south, but in the darkness they missed the rendezvous. They realised their error in the morning, but it was too late to backtrack, as they would have run into the enemy.

After 14 days the unit ran out of food and five guerrillas were sent to the nearest village to obtain food from the inhabitants, while another two were dispatched to buy food from the closest shop. The latter were intercepted by the police who demanded to see their passes. One of the guerrillas drew his pistol and the police fled, leaving their bicycles behind. While returning to their unit to raise the alarm about having been discovered, the guerrillas were ambushed, and one was killed. When the second man rejoined his comrades, the commander decided to avenge the dead freedom fighter, and around 7:15 pm they attacked a security force platoon, which was forced to flee, leaving its food lorry on fire. The retreating soldiers called for an air strike, and the guerrillas were forced to retreat without capturing any supplies. The next morning they again clashed with the security forces, in the battle that left four freedom fighters and 12 Rhodesians dead, according to Mopedi.

After amplifying their wounded, the Rhodesians bombarded the position from the air until 5:40 pm. The guerrillas had retreated some 800 yards from the target area and realised that the Rhodesians had no idea of their exact location. Due to the intensive bombing, however, they had to bury their dead at night, before leaving the area. Five days later they crossed a river (most likely the Hunyani) as enemy aircraft patrolled overhead and set up a temporary base. Mopedi and 13 others went to nearby village to look for food leaving the detachment commander and seven other guerrillas at the base. When the food party returned the next morning, they found the base deserted and their belongings scattered over the terrain. There was no sign of their comrades and Mopeds assumed that the security forces had raided the camp and either captured or killed the missing men. He and the remaining cadres set off in the direction of the village once more and made a camp about 10 miles away, before going to seek help from the inhabitants.

In May 1968, Mzamo's unit was ambushed, and he was among those captured. Mzamo believed that contact with the local inhabitants, mainly farm workers, was the main reason the guerrilla force was detected. Not only where in sharp contrast to the tattered and dirty overalls worn by the farm labourers, and made them easily recognisable. Whanever local inhabitants were encountered, a guerrilla who spoke the dialect of the area was chosen as a spokes person and the rest had strict instructions not to speak. Mzamo explained:

You know I speak Shona. I speak Ndebele, but as soon as I open my mouth in Bulawayo - as soon as I open my mouth and speak Ndebele you will find, you know, somebody asking me, Are you Fingo? Meaning, do I come from the Fingo location about 25 miles east of Bulawayo.

According to Mzamo reaction of the local population varied from person to person. Some were afraid of the guerrillas, some hated them and wanted nothing to do with them, while others welcomed and supported them. The ANC however, claimed that there was a good working relationship between inhabitants of the Sipolilo area and the guerrillas. Alfred Kgokong, Director of Publicity, wrote:

Our guerrillas had been working among the masses in this area for sseveral months before the current phase of fighting. The fact alone testifies to the enthusiastic cooperation of the masses with the freedom Fighters and again shows that without this mass support, the vicious, all-out military onslaught of the white racist forces would have been most devastating.

In addition to attacking Mzamo's unit, the security forces also found the base on top of the cliff where the two sections of the Pyramid Detachment had planned to meet. The camp was bombed, but its not clear whether any MK or ZIPRA members where there at that time. On 15 April 1968, the ANC leadership published its account of Sipolilo campaign in its official newsletter, Mayibuye:

Bitter and fierce struggles are raking place in Zimbabwe at places widely separated from each other and in the north and south of the country. On 2 April, after eliminating an army reservist and a trooper, the guerrillas laid an ambush for the pursuing troops. In the ensuing battle 22 troops lay dead. This engagement took place in the Acturus district. On the same day, in a mutual support attack, guerrillas operating in the southern part of the country also saw battle: rather a one sided battle. At a construction site on the Ngwizi River some 20 to 30 miles south of Plumtree near the Botswana border, an army patrol was engaged by the guerrillas in a dramatic daylight attack and 35 enemy troops were wiped out, 25 of them Rhodesian and the rest South Africans. The surviving enemy troops fled to the construction site, but they were resolutely pursued by our men and continued their flight into the bush. The fiercest battle of the current guerrilla campaign took place near Mazoe on the 3 April. Our guerrillas wiped out 72 army troops. Some well informed sources have given the number of South African troops killed in the recent battles as 42. An old man, a ZAPU supporter, told them that the security forces suspected everyone in the village of either being a 'terrorist' or harbouring guerrillas. Some of the young men had been arrested and tortured by the police, and the supply of canned food was being rationed to prevent freedom fighters from stocking up. With the help of the old man, Mopedi's unit organised villagers to commit acts of sabotage and make contact with other ZAPU supporters in the vicinity. They also linked up with Tswimbo, a cadre who had been tended by some of villagers since being wounded. His caregivers insisted that the guerrillas visit the local Maswikiro ( spirit medium). Although they were not keen, refusal would have offended the people who had offered them hospitality and protection, so after a long and sometimes heated debate, Tswimbo and some villager went to the Motswikiro, who told them he would shroud the movement of of the guerrillas in thick mist.

On their way backstop the village, they were stopped and questioned by by a special branch policeman. The following morning the villager who had accompanied Tswimbo was arrested and revealed everything. The old man was short dead on his way to the guerrillas camp, and police and soldiers combed the entire area until they found and attacked the camp. Mopedi was wounded during the fighting and was eventually taken to a safe house where he was able to recuperate. The rest of the unit withdrew from the area, leaving him behind. Ralph Mzamo offered another version of events on the Eastern Front. He contended that the Pyramid Detachment's objective was to make contact with local villagers and train them to prepare for the armed revolution. Under the leadership of ZAPU commander Moffat Hadebe, it took about three months before they made contacts with the Rhodesian security forces. By that time they'd run out of food and had resorted to killing wild animals, including elephants and iguanas. They also ran out of salt and began to suffer from iron deficiency, which particularly affected their knees and elbows.

Many collapsed, especially city dwellers like Mzamo, born and bred in Port Elizabeth. The terrain proved difficult to master, because they had to march up an escapement without adequate cover to build a temporary base for recuperation. When the first contact with the security forces took place, the guerrillas were already tired. Without regard for the possible dangers, a few of them went to buy food at a village store. The first trip passed without incident but on their second visit, the cadres were arrested and interrogated by the special branch. Rhodesian forces cordoned off the area and began searching for the rest of the unit. Mzamo claimed that the villagers had informed the police about the presence of strangers, resulting in surveillance of all the shops and the eventual discovery of the guerrillas. On 12 July, fresh clashes occurred when 21 ZAPU soldiers entered Rhodesia at the confluence of the Zambezi and Gwaai Rivers destined for Hartley, and the separate group of 38 guerrillas crossed at the Cheware River confluence. The following day, another 28 crossed into the Chirundu district and headed for the Lupane. The Rhodesian forces killed 15 guerrillas on 12 July and captured several more. The next day, the South African forces killed 24 insurgents and captured another three. Morris observed:

The kill and captured ratio is extraordinarily high and speaks volumes for the courage, dedication, willingness and purposefulness of the South African men on the border. The South Africans lost Daniel du Toit, who was shot in the head and became the first South African casualty. Four South Africans and two Rhodesians were wounded. Michael M Morris recorded the Rhodesian and South African forces account of the Sipolilo battles. According to Morris, on 14 March a ranger from from the Rhodesian Department of Parks and wildlife discovered a well-worn path leading towards the Chiramambakadoma Hill. On close examination he noticed distinctive prints that had clearly not been made by Africans living in the area. He estimated that at least 40 men had tramped the path, and notified the police immediately. From their hiding place the guerrillas watched police inspecting the path but held their fire, because their orders were not to confront the security forces until they were well entrenched. Subsequently, the Rhodesian security forces found more evidence that a large group of guerrillas was there.

Morris puts the date of the first skirmish at 18 March in the vicinity of Mana Pools on the Angwa River. The guerrillas had constructed defences on the side of the hill, and despite a lengthy battle, the security forces were unable to dislodge them. They then called in air strikes, and because of a number of guerrillas had abandoned their temporary positions in anticipation of aerial attack, the casualty toll was limited to 11 dead guerrillas and three Rhodesians, according to Morris. Afterwards the guerrillas split into four sections, each withdrawing in a different direction. In the days that followed, the security forces adopted 'search and destroy' tactics, gradually forcing the guerrillas to break up into even smaller groups. They hampered by continuous harassment from the security forces, and by lack of food, communication and military equipment.

Morris claimed that these operations resulted in the deaths of a large number of guerrillas, although their commander, Moffat Hadebe, escaped, only only to be arrested later by Portuguese forces in Mozambique. March and May 1968 brought reports if fierce fighting in the Zambezi Valley, involving the second wave of guerrillas who crossed into Rhodesia in February. Photo, who was member of that unit, recalled that following an encounter with Rhodesian soldiers on the banks of the Zambezi, they withdrew and marched for several weeks without incident until they ran into ambush in May. Those who escaped were forced to retreat into Zambia. way back to Zambia. A few of those who were captured switched loyalties and joined Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation ( CIO) or the Bureau of S State Security ( BOSS) in South Africa. Only a small number of MK members who participated in the Walkie campaign manage to make their way to South Africa. The General Blue Book signed by the Rhodesian Secretary for Defence, Eldon Trollip, put security force losses for 1968 a at even dead and 15 wounded. The fighting had a demoralizing effect on the young Rhodesian soldiers, many of them teenagers, experiencing war for the first time, have seen six of their comrades die in the bush and nine injured. It is all but impossible to determine the exact number of the casualties during the Sipolilo campaign. Both the Rhodesians and the guerrillas were anxious to conceal their own losses and inflate those of the opposing side. Official reports claimed that 55 guerrillas had been killed by end of April 1968, with six white and one African security force deaths and one seriously wounded.

The police reported that they had killed 25 guerrillas by the end JuLy 1968. The Rhodesian minister of Defence told the media that more than 160 terrorist had been killed by December 1968 and that a considerable number of others had been surrendered, been captured or forced to seek refuge in neighboring countries. It is important to note that the Smith and Voters regimes never revealed the true number of security force casualties suffered during the liberation wars. Jimmy Mopedi claimed that his unit killed 12 Rhodesian soldiers during the first encounter of the Sipolilo campaign, but said they could not count the number of enemy dead during the second encounter because an air strike forced them to make hasty retreat. He put enemy fatalities in the third encounter at 12 as well. An ANC/ZAPU communique on the 25 July 1968 put the Rhodesian dead at 33 with several more wounded.

The most reliable source would be the list of casualties published later by each side to honour their dead. The ANC list of those died in exile names 23 cadres killed during the Sipolilo campaigns, while an official Rhodesian Roll of honour list two dead on 18 March, four on 26 March, one on 10 April and one in an unidentified battle. Newspapers accounts of the Sipolilo campaign reveal a measure of admiration and respect for the guerrillas. On 7 April 1968, the Sunday times in South Africa reported:

Terrorist in the new incursions are proving better armed better equipped, better trained, and tougher than those in previous forays. The London Daily Telegraph said:

In their initial contacts with the security forces, the terrorist displayed a high degree of skill in laying ambushes, concealing their camps and covering their tracks when pursued. They fought hard and well in confrontations, and their ability to trek many miles through the hazardous bush carrying weapons and 200 lb packs bore testimony to the degree of their training.
Moffat Hadebe, the commander of the Sipolilo campaign, hid in the bush with one of his men for seven months before being captured by Portuguese forces in Mozambique.

The guerrillas who survived the Wankie and Sipolilo campaign were either captured in Rhodesia or Botswana, or managed to make their way back to Zambia. A few of those who were captured switched loyalties and joined Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation ( CIO) or the Bureau of State Security ( BOSS) in South Africa. Only a small number of MK who participated in the Wankie campaign manage to make their way to South Africa.