Opinion / Columnist
ZRP should be sincere on Professor Moyo saga
19 Oct 2016 at 13:08hrs | Views
Zimbabweans were astounded to read that, "Police have not arrested Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development Minister, Professor Jonathan Moyo because no report has been made to that effect." The story quoted the Acting Police Commissioner-General, Senior Assistant Commissioner as saying.
Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) exposed that Professor Moyo misappropriated $450 000. What amazes many is the fact that police is deliberately ignoring effort put by ZACC in the course of their constitutional mandate. This leaves more questions than answers.
Where is the missing link between the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and ZACC? These two public statutory bodies should synchronise their workmanship in order to weed out corruption which gnawing our national resources at an alarming rate.
Supposedly, one had committed murder and the murderer is identified, Was the ZRP going to await a formal report to that effect? Certainly not! ZRP should play its constitutional mandatory obligation without any fear or favour. This is the only way to ensure the existence of justice in the Republic of Zimbabwe.
ZRP is obliged to safeguard itself against facing allegations of the selective application of the law amongst citizens.
One may ask if ZACC hasn't engaged the involvement of ZRP in the Moyo saga. It is unlikely, considering the fact that ZACC has no arresting powers. Honestly, what role does the ZRP play in nabbing corruption if they behave in such a hypocritical manner of pretending never to understand the elementary facts of the simple matter at stake.
Possibly, to avert this misnomer, ZACC should be given prosecutorial powers to enhance the statutory body's mandate to execute its duties effectively and efficiently.
Meanwhile, ZACC says it is dependent on the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and the Prosecutor General's office for processing corruption cases. More oftenly, ZACC claims that most cases have been compromised due to the long pipeline which involves other agencies. Therefore, gaining both arresting and prosecutorial powers would certainly shorten the process and improve on service delivery.
Studies have revealed that agencies possessing both prosecutorial power and enhanced investigative power, like in Georgia, USA, emerged to be extremely powerful agency which can fight corruption efficiently.
In Georgia, the Investigative Division of the Prosecution has the power to investigate and prosecute corruption. The only limitation to this power is the ability of the Minister of Justice to intervene where high level officials have been implicated. However, the minister's power has not hampered the effectiveness of the agency owing to the strong political will to fight corruption in the country.
At the time of starting the anti-corruption reform agenda in 2003, Georgia was ranked 124 out of 133 countries on the Corruption Perception Index, but is now ranked 51 out of 174 countries.
One of the main reasons policymakers cite for establishing a stand-alone, independent anti-corruption agency is the need to strengthen the enforcement of their nation's laws against bribery, conflict of interest, and other corruption crimes. But while a broad international consensus exists on the value of creating a new agency with investigative powers, opinion remains sharply divided on whether these agencies should also have the power to prosecute the crimes it uncovers.
No matter the country, debate about whether a single agency should have the power to both investigate and prosecute corruption cases inevitably comes down to a small set of conflicting claims. Those who oppose giving a single agency both powers raise an argument at the centre of the older debate about the relative responsibilities of police and prosecutors — investigator bias.
In the words of a British Royal Commission that studied the relationship between English police and prosecutors, an investigator "without any improper motive, may be inclined to shut his mind to other evidence telling against the guilt of the suspect or to over-estimate the strength of the evidence he has assembled." That is, once an investigator hones in on a suspect, confirmation bias sets in, and he or she will interpret all evidence as supporting the suspect's guilt.
Putting the decision about whether to prosecute a case in an agency wholly separate from the one that investigates provides a strong check against such bias, reducing the chances that the innocent will be put to a trial or weak cases brought to court.
Ideally, studies have indicated that anti-corruption agencies with both responsibilities for both investigating and prosecuting corruption are likely to be more effective in enforcing the anti-corruption laws.
It is however, worth noting that, some anti-corruption agencies have succeeded without having prosecutorial powers. For instance, the Hong Kong and Singapore agencies being notable examples were infamous agencies which possessed both investigative and prosecutorial power, but have been ineffective in their public mandate to fight corruption. But by and large dividing the powers between two agencies makes the effective enforcement of the anti-corruption laws all the more difficult to achieve.
Effective enforcement of all laws demands, a close, professional, and robust relationship between investigators and prosecutors. But again, if the two are in separate agencies, this goal is all the harder to achieve. When prosecutors decline to prosecute a case an investigator has worked long and hard developing, it is easy for the investigator to treat it as a personal slight.
Furthermore, prosecutors often need a good deal of time to review a lengthy file, but delays are commonly seen by civil society as a lack of commitment to prosecuting corruption case or, when after a delay the file is rejected, that corruption has have infected the review process.
Identifying who is accountable for weak enforcement of the anti-corruption laws is virtually impossible when responsibility is split between two agencies. Investigators say weak enforcement is the prosecutors' fault; they are refusing to prosecute solid cases. Prosecutors point the finger at the investigators, saying the cases they present are weak.
So there is need to establish an independent committee to re-look into the best international practices which can be adopted and implemented to fortify the ZACC so as to foster their duty execution in curtailing corruption.
Otherwise the Moyo saga is a tip of the iceberg. Much more should be exposed by ZACC in order to cleanse our nation of corruption demon which is bedevilling our nation. There should be no sacred cows.
Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) exposed that Professor Moyo misappropriated $450 000. What amazes many is the fact that police is deliberately ignoring effort put by ZACC in the course of their constitutional mandate. This leaves more questions than answers.
Where is the missing link between the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and ZACC? These two public statutory bodies should synchronise their workmanship in order to weed out corruption which gnawing our national resources at an alarming rate.
Supposedly, one had committed murder and the murderer is identified, Was the ZRP going to await a formal report to that effect? Certainly not! ZRP should play its constitutional mandatory obligation without any fear or favour. This is the only way to ensure the existence of justice in the Republic of Zimbabwe.
ZRP is obliged to safeguard itself against facing allegations of the selective application of the law amongst citizens.
One may ask if ZACC hasn't engaged the involvement of ZRP in the Moyo saga. It is unlikely, considering the fact that ZACC has no arresting powers. Honestly, what role does the ZRP play in nabbing corruption if they behave in such a hypocritical manner of pretending never to understand the elementary facts of the simple matter at stake.
Possibly, to avert this misnomer, ZACC should be given prosecutorial powers to enhance the statutory body's mandate to execute its duties effectively and efficiently.
Meanwhile, ZACC says it is dependent on the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and the Prosecutor General's office for processing corruption cases. More oftenly, ZACC claims that most cases have been compromised due to the long pipeline which involves other agencies. Therefore, gaining both arresting and prosecutorial powers would certainly shorten the process and improve on service delivery.
Studies have revealed that agencies possessing both prosecutorial power and enhanced investigative power, like in Georgia, USA, emerged to be extremely powerful agency which can fight corruption efficiently.
In Georgia, the Investigative Division of the Prosecution has the power to investigate and prosecute corruption. The only limitation to this power is the ability of the Minister of Justice to intervene where high level officials have been implicated. However, the minister's power has not hampered the effectiveness of the agency owing to the strong political will to fight corruption in the country.
At the time of starting the anti-corruption reform agenda in 2003, Georgia was ranked 124 out of 133 countries on the Corruption Perception Index, but is now ranked 51 out of 174 countries.
One of the main reasons policymakers cite for establishing a stand-alone, independent anti-corruption agency is the need to strengthen the enforcement of their nation's laws against bribery, conflict of interest, and other corruption crimes. But while a broad international consensus exists on the value of creating a new agency with investigative powers, opinion remains sharply divided on whether these agencies should also have the power to prosecute the crimes it uncovers.
No matter the country, debate about whether a single agency should have the power to both investigate and prosecute corruption cases inevitably comes down to a small set of conflicting claims. Those who oppose giving a single agency both powers raise an argument at the centre of the older debate about the relative responsibilities of police and prosecutors — investigator bias.
In the words of a British Royal Commission that studied the relationship between English police and prosecutors, an investigator "without any improper motive, may be inclined to shut his mind to other evidence telling against the guilt of the suspect or to over-estimate the strength of the evidence he has assembled." That is, once an investigator hones in on a suspect, confirmation bias sets in, and he or she will interpret all evidence as supporting the suspect's guilt.
Putting the decision about whether to prosecute a case in an agency wholly separate from the one that investigates provides a strong check against such bias, reducing the chances that the innocent will be put to a trial or weak cases brought to court.
Ideally, studies have indicated that anti-corruption agencies with both responsibilities for both investigating and prosecuting corruption are likely to be more effective in enforcing the anti-corruption laws.
It is however, worth noting that, some anti-corruption agencies have succeeded without having prosecutorial powers. For instance, the Hong Kong and Singapore agencies being notable examples were infamous agencies which possessed both investigative and prosecutorial power, but have been ineffective in their public mandate to fight corruption. But by and large dividing the powers between two agencies makes the effective enforcement of the anti-corruption laws all the more difficult to achieve.
Effective enforcement of all laws demands, a close, professional, and robust relationship between investigators and prosecutors. But again, if the two are in separate agencies, this goal is all the harder to achieve. When prosecutors decline to prosecute a case an investigator has worked long and hard developing, it is easy for the investigator to treat it as a personal slight.
Furthermore, prosecutors often need a good deal of time to review a lengthy file, but delays are commonly seen by civil society as a lack of commitment to prosecuting corruption case or, when after a delay the file is rejected, that corruption has have infected the review process.
Identifying who is accountable for weak enforcement of the anti-corruption laws is virtually impossible when responsibility is split between two agencies. Investigators say weak enforcement is the prosecutors' fault; they are refusing to prosecute solid cases. Prosecutors point the finger at the investigators, saying the cases they present are weak.
So there is need to establish an independent committee to re-look into the best international practices which can be adopted and implemented to fortify the ZACC so as to foster their duty execution in curtailing corruption.
Otherwise the Moyo saga is a tip of the iceberg. Much more should be exposed by ZACC in order to cleanse our nation of corruption demon which is bedevilling our nation. There should be no sacred cows.
Source - Sparkleford Masiyambiri
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