Opinion / Columnist
The Chinhoyi Battle: Did Zanu send its guerrillas on a suicide mission
27 Jul 2017 at 07:17hrs | Views
During the early years of Zimbabwe's struggle for independence, Zanu's military high command based in Zambia infiltrated its first group of Chinese trained guerrillas into Rhodesia with orders to carry out sabotage mission that included attacks on power lines and harassment of white farmers.
According to information obtained from Rhodesian military archieves, the Zanu high command dispatched between 14 and 20 guerrillas with Simon Chimbadza as the group commander. The guerrillas had instructions to split into three groups on reaching Chinhoyi, formerly Sinoa, a small town about 100 km north-west of the then Salisbury in Mashonaland West province.
The guerrilla invasion was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the execution of Nehanda Nyakasikana affectionately known by the Shona as Mbuya Nehanda. The guerrillas believed Nehanda's spirit protected them during the war. Nehanda was hanged by the colonial Rhodesian government on April 27, 1896. Before she died she allegedly uttered the words-"my bones shall rise again. "
The Zanu guerrillas were intercepted by the police a few hours after entering Chinhoyi. The authorities dispatched 40 members of the police counter-insurgency unit, PATU or Police Anti-Terrorist Unit. PATU, which became the police support unit after independence, was attached to the British South Africa Police(BSAP).
The police unit, with the cover of four helicopters, cornered the guerrillas near Hunyani River and a fire-fight ensued. With the advantage of air superiority, the counter-insurgency police unit massacred the guerrillas after several hours of skirmishes. A veteran former Special Branch officer, Brandon Murphy said there was never a fire fight between the guerrillas and the police unit.
He said the guerrillas were simply slaughtered by the Rhodesians as they lacked combat experience. They proved no match for the Rhodesians whose counter-insurgency methods became the envy of some countries including South Africa. After independence, South Africa incoporated many ex-Rhodesian soldiers who were involved in counter-insurgency operations.
"Those guerrillas were like sheep being led to a slaughter house. It was poor strategy by the commanders to deploy seven guerrillas against a professional army, "said Murphy who is now in his late 70s. Some analysts at the time said Zanu leaders sent their guerrillas on a suicide mission just to grab international news headlines and attract the attention of the Organisation of African Unity(OAU) now African Union(AU). Zanu leaders had accused the continetal body of favouring Joshua Nkomo.
Some African leaders were skeptical of Zanu's military capabilities after the split with Zapu in 1963. Zapu had impressed the OAU after it received massive military support and supplies from the Russians. By deploying the seven guerrillas on 28 April 1966, Zanu wanted its fighters to fire the first bullet that signalled the beginning of the armed struggle against Rhodesia. Military archieves however show that Zapu war activities began around 1963 when the party sent its first recruits for training in Russia, Cuba, Bulgaria, Algeria and other countries under the Warsaw Pact military alliance led by the Soviet Union.
The OAU was not happy with the split between Zapu and Zanu. As a result of the split, some African leaders resented Zanu describing its leaders as traitors. But the Chinhoyi battle appeared to have changed the attitude of some of the leaders. Some of them, like Tanzania's Julius Nyerere started believing in Zanu's capability to fight the war and decided to offer the party some training bases. But in military terms, the Chinhoyi battle was a public relations disaster for Zanu. According to the party, the guerrillas battled the Rhodesian soldiers the whole day.
There is however a big difference between a battle and hit and run clashes. Military speaking, there was no way seven guerrillas, their first time in combat, could have battled a professional army with air support the whole day. It was said that the guerrillas ran out of ammunition after a few hours. Thats when the Rhodesians signalled for them to surrender. When they refused, they were all wiped out.
The Rhodesia version of the event: There were no soldiers involved in the Chinhoyi battle as claimed by Zanu. The fire-fight was simply between the guerrillas and the police counter-insurgency unit, PATU commanded by Frank Barfoot. The police unit had support from four helicopters. All the seven were killed while the police did not suffer any casualties. The fire-fight took less than three hours not the whole day as claimed by Zanu.
The Zanu version of that fateful day:The battle between its guerrillas and the Rhodesian army lasted the whole day from 9 in the morning till around 5 in the afternoon. The guerrillas killed 25 soldiers. But Zanu did not provide any evidence of dead bodies of the enemy because no soldiers were involved in the battle.
The truth as revealed by the war archieves show that the Rhodesian army suffered its first war casualty during the two weeks Wankie battles that involved a combined Zapu-Umkhonto weSizwe(MK) guerrilla unit. The Zapu-MK joint operations against the Rhodesians involved 101 guerrillas under the command of Plumtree born John Dube. The MK units were drawn from the Luthuli Detachment. The Wankie battles began on August 13 until mid-September 1967.
One soldier was killed and two wounded after two weeks of fighting. The Rhodesians said they killed 11 Zipra-MK guerrillas. That was the largest guerrilla invasion ever witnessed by the enemy. A repeat operation was conducted by Zipra-MK units in Sipolilo in 1968. The operation involved 74Zipra and 24 MK fighters.
The commander of the combined force of Zipra-MK was Moffart Hadebe. Before that Zapu was involved in sabotage campaigns of 1960/61. Speaking to a Harare journalist before he died, Zanu struggle stalwart, Kumbirai Kangai criticised the decision by the party's high command to deploy the seven guerrillas. He said the guerrillas were not properly prepared for the mission as they were still fresh from training. He was quoted as saying sometimes the military leaders sent guerrillas into Rhodesia armed only with pistols or with no ammunition at all.
This is how the Rhodesian military rated the two guerrilla movements.
Zanla: lacked co-ordination, poorly trained and equipped. Its fighters lacked discipline.
Zipra: well trained, well equipped by the Russians, disciplined fighters and formidable.
Zanla army commander: Rex Nhongo aka as Solomon Mujuru.
Zipra army commander:Lookout Mafela Masuku
Zipra intelligence chief: Dumiso Dabengwa
In addition to its guerrilla units, Zapu had trained a conventional force-also known as the regular army with 5000 professional soldiers. The regular army was trained for Zapu final push towards the war which became known as Zero Hour. The regular army was commanded by Stanford Khumalo.
The military campaigns by both Zapu and Zanu had one positive effect for the two liberation movements. They made the black population believe in their leaders again after the split which shattered the nation.
According to information obtained from Rhodesian military archieves, the Zanu high command dispatched between 14 and 20 guerrillas with Simon Chimbadza as the group commander. The guerrillas had instructions to split into three groups on reaching Chinhoyi, formerly Sinoa, a small town about 100 km north-west of the then Salisbury in Mashonaland West province.
The guerrilla invasion was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the execution of Nehanda Nyakasikana affectionately known by the Shona as Mbuya Nehanda. The guerrillas believed Nehanda's spirit protected them during the war. Nehanda was hanged by the colonial Rhodesian government on April 27, 1896. Before she died she allegedly uttered the words-"my bones shall rise again. "
The Zanu guerrillas were intercepted by the police a few hours after entering Chinhoyi. The authorities dispatched 40 members of the police counter-insurgency unit, PATU or Police Anti-Terrorist Unit. PATU, which became the police support unit after independence, was attached to the British South Africa Police(BSAP).
The police unit, with the cover of four helicopters, cornered the guerrillas near Hunyani River and a fire-fight ensued. With the advantage of air superiority, the counter-insurgency police unit massacred the guerrillas after several hours of skirmishes. A veteran former Special Branch officer, Brandon Murphy said there was never a fire fight between the guerrillas and the police unit.
He said the guerrillas were simply slaughtered by the Rhodesians as they lacked combat experience. They proved no match for the Rhodesians whose counter-insurgency methods became the envy of some countries including South Africa. After independence, South Africa incoporated many ex-Rhodesian soldiers who were involved in counter-insurgency operations.
"Those guerrillas were like sheep being led to a slaughter house. It was poor strategy by the commanders to deploy seven guerrillas against a professional army, "said Murphy who is now in his late 70s. Some analysts at the time said Zanu leaders sent their guerrillas on a suicide mission just to grab international news headlines and attract the attention of the Organisation of African Unity(OAU) now African Union(AU). Zanu leaders had accused the continetal body of favouring Joshua Nkomo.
Some African leaders were skeptical of Zanu's military capabilities after the split with Zapu in 1963. Zapu had impressed the OAU after it received massive military support and supplies from the Russians. By deploying the seven guerrillas on 28 April 1966, Zanu wanted its fighters to fire the first bullet that signalled the beginning of the armed struggle against Rhodesia. Military archieves however show that Zapu war activities began around 1963 when the party sent its first recruits for training in Russia, Cuba, Bulgaria, Algeria and other countries under the Warsaw Pact military alliance led by the Soviet Union.
The OAU was not happy with the split between Zapu and Zanu. As a result of the split, some African leaders resented Zanu describing its leaders as traitors. But the Chinhoyi battle appeared to have changed the attitude of some of the leaders. Some of them, like Tanzania's Julius Nyerere started believing in Zanu's capability to fight the war and decided to offer the party some training bases. But in military terms, the Chinhoyi battle was a public relations disaster for Zanu. According to the party, the guerrillas battled the Rhodesian soldiers the whole day.
There is however a big difference between a battle and hit and run clashes. Military speaking, there was no way seven guerrillas, their first time in combat, could have battled a professional army with air support the whole day. It was said that the guerrillas ran out of ammunition after a few hours. Thats when the Rhodesians signalled for them to surrender. When they refused, they were all wiped out.
The Rhodesia version of the event: There were no soldiers involved in the Chinhoyi battle as claimed by Zanu. The fire-fight was simply between the guerrillas and the police counter-insurgency unit, PATU commanded by Frank Barfoot. The police unit had support from four helicopters. All the seven were killed while the police did not suffer any casualties. The fire-fight took less than three hours not the whole day as claimed by Zanu.
The Zanu version of that fateful day:The battle between its guerrillas and the Rhodesian army lasted the whole day from 9 in the morning till around 5 in the afternoon. The guerrillas killed 25 soldiers. But Zanu did not provide any evidence of dead bodies of the enemy because no soldiers were involved in the battle.
The truth as revealed by the war archieves show that the Rhodesian army suffered its first war casualty during the two weeks Wankie battles that involved a combined Zapu-Umkhonto weSizwe(MK) guerrilla unit. The Zapu-MK joint operations against the Rhodesians involved 101 guerrillas under the command of Plumtree born John Dube. The MK units were drawn from the Luthuli Detachment. The Wankie battles began on August 13 until mid-September 1967.
One soldier was killed and two wounded after two weeks of fighting. The Rhodesians said they killed 11 Zipra-MK guerrillas. That was the largest guerrilla invasion ever witnessed by the enemy. A repeat operation was conducted by Zipra-MK units in Sipolilo in 1968. The operation involved 74Zipra and 24 MK fighters.
The commander of the combined force of Zipra-MK was Moffart Hadebe. Before that Zapu was involved in sabotage campaigns of 1960/61. Speaking to a Harare journalist before he died, Zanu struggle stalwart, Kumbirai Kangai criticised the decision by the party's high command to deploy the seven guerrillas. He said the guerrillas were not properly prepared for the mission as they were still fresh from training. He was quoted as saying sometimes the military leaders sent guerrillas into Rhodesia armed only with pistols or with no ammunition at all.
This is how the Rhodesian military rated the two guerrilla movements.
Zanla: lacked co-ordination, poorly trained and equipped. Its fighters lacked discipline.
Zipra: well trained, well equipped by the Russians, disciplined fighters and formidable.
Zanla army commander: Rex Nhongo aka as Solomon Mujuru.
Zipra army commander:Lookout Mafela Masuku
Zipra intelligence chief: Dumiso Dabengwa
In addition to its guerrilla units, Zapu had trained a conventional force-also known as the regular army with 5000 professional soldiers. The regular army was trained for Zapu final push towards the war which became known as Zero Hour. The regular army was commanded by Stanford Khumalo.
The military campaigns by both Zapu and Zanu had one positive effect for the two liberation movements. They made the black population believe in their leaders again after the split which shattered the nation.
Source - Thabo Kunene
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