Opinion / Blogs
Africa must build peacekeeping ability
06 Jun 2011 at 06:27hrs | Views
Russia's Foreign minister is regretting failing to veto the Libya
resolution. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan says that NATO actions
have gone far beyond the Security Council mandate and blocked chances
of an early resolution by targeting Muammar Gaddafi and his family. In
Ivory Coast it took the French to take out Laurent Gbagbo. Meanwhile,
the African Union and its regional communities are in a state of
paralysis, if not comatose.
First, AU was ignored in the run-up to the resolution; then, African members of the Council voted 'yes' and, now, its peace initiative stands in abeyance. This situation is yet another rude reminder that Africa badly needs to build its own peacekeeping capacity.
This lesson should have been learned years ago. Two cases serve to illustrate this point – Rwanda and DRC. It is well known that the UN had deployed a UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993, in connection with the peace agreement between the RPF and the Rwanda government. It is also well established that the UN had received sufficient early warning information before the genocide. Yet, it failed to intervene and prevent the gruesome bloodshed.
Rather than mounting an operation to seek and recover hidden arms as requested by UNAMIR commander Gen. Dallaire, the UN turned the request down claiming that an operation of that kind "did not lie within UNAMIR's mandate". Instead of the beefing up the UNAMIR forces the UN contributing members withdrew their contingents at the crucial moment.
In its indictment of the UNSC, the Ingvar Carlsson Inquiry, into the UN's role, concluded that: "There was a serious gap between the mandate and the political realities in Rwanda and between the mandate and the resources dedicated to it". The mission was; "…the victim of the lack of political will on the part of the UNSC and other member states".
The then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, had to apologize expressing "deep remorse". Meanwhile, the refugee flows unleashed into the DRC by the Rwanda conflict provided part of the justification for Rwanda's involvement in the anti-Mobutu struggle and its later intervention in the DRC.
In the DRC UN dereliction of duty assumed a different form. Here, it took on the form of foot-dragging and indecision arising from competing interests and linkage politics in the UNSC. The SADC countries, to which the DRC belongs, had determined that the conflict in the DRC was essentially the invasion of DRC by Rwanda and Uganda as early as the outbreak of the conflict in August 1998.
On the basis of this the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security authorized and deployed a regional peacekeeping mission which included Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, on a 'willing and able principle'. This mission contained the situation and stabilized the country preventing an impending break-up or partition of the country, but did not receive any assistance, encouragement or credit from the UN.
The UN Security Council, on the other hand, took nearly one year to acknowledge the invasion through UNSC Resolution 1234 of April 1999 which demanded a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces, failing to draw a distinction between the SADC peacekeepers and the invading countries. Moreover, no mechanism was set in place to give effect to the demands of the UNSC until February 2000 when the first MONUC mission authorizing an armed force of 5,5000 but an initial force strength of 1,300.
This was in contrast to the 20,000 peacekeepers requested by Joseph Kabila in his consultations with the UN in May, 2001 when he said: "The commitment (from the United Nations) is not what we really expected. The commitment is lacking in terms of personnel and resources".
By this time, an estimated 2.5 million people had died and a comparable number displaced. Needless to say, this was partly because MONUC became hostage to the inter-imperialist struggles in the Great Lakes region.
It was also due to the Anglo-American pressures on Zimbabwe to quit the DRC and to reverse the land redistribution policy in the country. It is for this reason that the initial MONUC mission was merely symbolic. It was expanded at the end of 2002; only after the SADC allied forces had been disbanded and Zimbabwe had withdrawn from DRC. MONUC remains scandal ridden and ineffective. Yet this was the first truly pan African peace-keeping mission. It was also a success.
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Professor Baregu lectures at Saut and can be contacted at mbageru980@gmail.com
First, AU was ignored in the run-up to the resolution; then, African members of the Council voted 'yes' and, now, its peace initiative stands in abeyance. This situation is yet another rude reminder that Africa badly needs to build its own peacekeeping capacity.
This lesson should have been learned years ago. Two cases serve to illustrate this point – Rwanda and DRC. It is well known that the UN had deployed a UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993, in connection with the peace agreement between the RPF and the Rwanda government. It is also well established that the UN had received sufficient early warning information before the genocide. Yet, it failed to intervene and prevent the gruesome bloodshed.
Rather than mounting an operation to seek and recover hidden arms as requested by UNAMIR commander Gen. Dallaire, the UN turned the request down claiming that an operation of that kind "did not lie within UNAMIR's mandate". Instead of the beefing up the UNAMIR forces the UN contributing members withdrew their contingents at the crucial moment.
In its indictment of the UNSC, the Ingvar Carlsson Inquiry, into the UN's role, concluded that: "There was a serious gap between the mandate and the political realities in Rwanda and between the mandate and the resources dedicated to it". The mission was; "…the victim of the lack of political will on the part of the UNSC and other member states".
The then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, had to apologize expressing "deep remorse". Meanwhile, the refugee flows unleashed into the DRC by the Rwanda conflict provided part of the justification for Rwanda's involvement in the anti-Mobutu struggle and its later intervention in the DRC.
In the DRC UN dereliction of duty assumed a different form. Here, it took on the form of foot-dragging and indecision arising from competing interests and linkage politics in the UNSC. The SADC countries, to which the DRC belongs, had determined that the conflict in the DRC was essentially the invasion of DRC by Rwanda and Uganda as early as the outbreak of the conflict in August 1998.
On the basis of this the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security authorized and deployed a regional peacekeeping mission which included Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, on a 'willing and able principle'. This mission contained the situation and stabilized the country preventing an impending break-up or partition of the country, but did not receive any assistance, encouragement or credit from the UN.
The UN Security Council, on the other hand, took nearly one year to acknowledge the invasion through UNSC Resolution 1234 of April 1999 which demanded a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces, failing to draw a distinction between the SADC peacekeepers and the invading countries. Moreover, no mechanism was set in place to give effect to the demands of the UNSC until February 2000 when the first MONUC mission authorizing an armed force of 5,5000 but an initial force strength of 1,300.
This was in contrast to the 20,000 peacekeepers requested by Joseph Kabila in his consultations with the UN in May, 2001 when he said: "The commitment (from the United Nations) is not what we really expected. The commitment is lacking in terms of personnel and resources".
By this time, an estimated 2.5 million people had died and a comparable number displaced. Needless to say, this was partly because MONUC became hostage to the inter-imperialist struggles in the Great Lakes region.
It was also due to the Anglo-American pressures on Zimbabwe to quit the DRC and to reverse the land redistribution policy in the country. It is for this reason that the initial MONUC mission was merely symbolic. It was expanded at the end of 2002; only after the SADC allied forces had been disbanded and Zimbabwe had withdrawn from DRC. MONUC remains scandal ridden and ineffective. Yet this was the first truly pan African peace-keeping mission. It was also a success.
------------
Professor Baregu lectures at Saut and can be contacted at mbageru980@gmail.com
Source - Mwesiga Baregu
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