ANC of Ramaphosa must brace itself for a messy implosion

For over six months, everyone argued about whether there would be consequences for former state president Jacob Zuma's action to support the Umkhonto WeSizwe Party (MKP) in the last national and provincial elections while still an ANC member and whether the ANC was bluffing or serious about calling him before a disciplinary committee.

Others, who had long criticised Zuma for sowing divisions within the ANC, said that he was trying to draw attention to himself ahead of the national elections and that it was all for show.

Among the analysts, there was a debate between the ANC internal workings watchers and the TV watchers. The ANC internal workings watchers saw the massive concentration of disapproval of Zuma's actions as many of his known staunch supporters spoke against his political move to campaign against the party he once led and warned of a permanent fallout.
The TV watchers said that journalists were not ramping up expulsion hysteria as they usually do before member expulsions seen in recent years, and that this meant there would be no disciplinary action or expulsion for Zuma.

The settling of the question, forever, came on the night of July 28, when the ANC's National Disciplinary Committee (NDC) terminated Zuma's decades-long party membership. The ANC statement said: "In the view of the NDC, organisational discipline is the glue that keeps the ANC together and focused on its stated objective of creating a better life for all."

Then came the hammer blow: "In the circumstances, the only sanction the NDC can impose is that of expulsion". However, the report notes Zuma can appeal his expulsion within 21 days if he still wants to retain his membership in the ANC. It would be uncharacteristic of him to let the opportunity pass.

Then, everyone began arguing about why. Was the ANC crazy? Was it genuinely concerned about organisational unity and curbing the opposition expansion? Was it thinking in apolitical categories that were fundamentally historical, along with timescales that made no sense to ordinary mortals? Was it trying, bit by bit, to reconstruct a transformed ANC, free from corruption baggage that gained notoriety in its circles as "Zuma's nine wasted years"? Was anyone next?

I travelled to different villages and towns during the election campaigns and after the announcement of the election results to see what I could learn about the attitude of South Africans towards Zuma's association with the MKP and, by implication, his disassociation from the ANC.

The mixed opinions expressed sounded politically charged. After the surprisingly good showing of the MKP in the polls, the political snow lay on the ground, and everyone was very calm about how Zuma (and his supporters) could iron out differences with the ANC.

Yes, insult trading was ramping up in some quarters following Zuma's election disputes in court after unsuccessful bumpy attempts to secure his name on the ballot. The space for political reconciliation was progressively narrowing, and many more people had defected from the ANC than was officially acknowledged.

And yes, speaking of defections, Zuma was stubborn, defiant, and paranoid about his actions, insisting that he was determined to change the ANC from the outside and forcing anyone who wanted to see him in person to discuss a truce to understand and admit that the ANC under Cyril Ramaphosa was beyond repair.

None of the ANC's internal workings watchers thought things were going in anything like the right direction, but none of the people I spoke to, some of them well-connected, thought an expulsion would happen.

They thought Zuma was engaged in coercive diplomacy. They thought the senior ANC leadership had lost its mind in underestimating the vast damage likely to result from Zuma's departure, especially after the formation of the unity government that included the DA.

I visited friends and university colleagues researching these matters, listened to their reflections, and explored various scenarios. Even if a disciplinary hearing did happen, it would be over quickly and send a stern warning message that ANC members must raise differences inside the party instead of forming splinter groups, we all agreed.

It would be like what we usually witness at ANC branches: a precision operation, the use of overwhelming political patronage superiority by Luthuli House. Zuma had always been so cautious – the sort of person who never started a fight he was unsure to win. It would be catastrophic but relatively painless. That was wrong.

We were all wrong. That everyone was wrong did not prevent everyone from immediately claiming that they had been right. Political experts who argued for years that Zuma was only concerned about his interests rushed forth to claim vindication, for he had undoubtedly become what they had claimed he was all along.

Other political experts who had been arguing for years that we needed to heed Zuma's warnings that only his loyal moves against the ANC could bring the party to its senses by reducing its electoral support also claim vindication (though more quietly) because Zuma had finally acted on those warnings and won the MKP a title of an official opposition in the National Assembly.

As usual, officials from Luthuli House administrations of yore were trotted out on TV as talking heads on Zuma's expulsion, dispensing their wisdom and accepting no responsibility, as if they had not all contributed, in one way or another, to the catastrophe.

This unfortunate ending was not inevitable, but we have been moving towards it for years: the ANC alliance, its leagues, and South Africa must brace itself for a messy implosion of the ANC. The ANC factional fighting is not over – it continues, as party members have frequently reminded us since the past two elective conferences that installed Ramaphosa as the party leader, until after Ramaphosa leaves office either prematurely or after the end of his office term.

Because the roots of the Zuma-Ramaphosa conflict go back even further, we might still experience the death throes of the former liberation empire. We are reaping, too, in the broader society, the fruits of our failed efforts to hold politicians accountable for their actions before they entrench patronage and corruption.

Things did not have to turn out this way, though where exactly the ANC and South Africa went wrong is much harder to determine.

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Nyembezi is a policy analyst, researcher and human rights activist.