News / National
Chatambudza's 'A lion eating its cubs?' is a disinformation campaign against ZPRA
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Nikita Mangena
I do not usually review scholarly material or critique academic work, but I must make an exception for Takawira Chatambudza's outrageously misleading article, "A Lion Eating Its Cubs? Assassinations, Mutinies, Renegades, and the Failure of ZIPRA's Turning Point Strategy, 1977–1980," published in Small Wars & Insurgencies in February 2025.
The level of disinformation and misinformation in this article raises serious questions about the quality of the peer-review process at the Taylor & Francis journal, which allowed some of its fabrications to pass as academic arguments.
The entire article is built on the premise that ZPRA - referred to by the author as ZIPRA - was a chaotic and ineffective organisation that failed to achieve its objectives during the liberation war. The author then works backwards to justify this conclusion, making numerous claims to explain ZPRA's alleged inefficiency. These claims largely revolve around accusations against ZAPU and ZPRA leaders and combatants, portraying them as either criminal or deliberately undermining the liberation struggle. Worse still, the article is littered with excitable, activist-style language rather than solid, irrefutable evidence to support these allegations.
As a result, the final product reads more like a Tsikamutanda Newsletter than a serious academic piece. Many of the article's damaging claims are presented as fact, yet they are clearly opinions designed to justify pre-existing biases against ZAPU in general and the Ndebele ethnic group in particular. Below are some of the most outrageous assertions made in the article.
First, the author boldly claims that ZAPU stalwarts Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo, Charles Sotsha Ngwenya (also known as John Dube or JD), and ZPRA commander Rogers Alfred Nikita Mangena were assassinated for plotting a coup against Joshua Nkomo. To lend credibility to this claim—or at least to cloak it in moral concern—the author suggests that their deaths weakened ZPRA's transition to conventional warfare in the late 1970s. The assassinations, he argues, compromised ZAPU/ZPRA's 'combat effectiveness …during a crucial phase of the armed struggle', ultimately leading to its failure to overthrow the Rhodesian regime through full-scale conventional warfare.
The second claim, closely linked to the first, is that Nkomo 'surround[ed] himself with loyalists [and] appointed mostly fellow Kalanga/Ndebele people to senior positions within ZAPU, to the detriment of the Shona, most of whom were Zezuru'. To support this, the author makes the factually incorrect claim that Nikita Mangena was Shona. According to the article, Mangena was not only killed for his alleged coup plot but also to make way for Ndebele/Kalanga leadership within ZPRA. Lookout Masuku's succession of Mangena is then framed as a deliberate move by Nkomo to ensure that only Kalanga or Ndebele loyalists led his movement.
The claim that Mangena was Shona is not only false but also an insult to the readers of the journal, as it is a fabricated assertion used to justify the pre-existing narrative that Nkomo purged ZAPU and ZPRA of Shona leadership. A simple background check would have clarified Mangena's ethnic identity—though, in any case, his ethnicity should not even be relevant when discussing his assassination. The author further claims that Ambrose Mutinhiri was overlooked as Mangena's successor solely because he was Shona.
However, the late former Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko was also overlooked when Masuku was appointed. Since Mphoko was Ndebele, his exclusion contradicts the author's narrative and is conveniently ignored. Why was Mutinhiri left out? That is a question the author should have investigated. From interviews with senior ZPRA commanders, the late Jack Mpofu explained that Mutinhiri was not appointed because, in 1971, he had defected with James Chikerema and others, including the late Tshinga Dube, to form FLORIZI. Mphoko himself stated in multiple interviews that, according to ZPRA hierarchy, he was next in line for command. His omission, he noted, remained a sore point in his relationship with the late Dumiso Dabengwa.
A related falsehood in the article is the claim that Shona guerrillas believed "ZAPU was an instrument for advancing the supremacy of the Ndebele ethnic group over the Shona majority" and consequently defected to ZANLA. To reinforce this, the author alleges that ZPRA guerrillas, possibly influenced by their Marxist ideology, "hated members of the vapostori sect", humiliated them by forcing them to drink the illicit brew sikokiyana, and routinely raped women in Shona villages.
Given ZAPU's historically diverse leadership, I have tried to understand the basis of this claim. Did the author even attempt to verify whether any guerrilla ever made such statements? Was he unaware that desertions between ZPRA and ZANLA were not uncommon? Moreover, what ideology did ZANLA cadres follow if not Marxism?
The article further claims that ZPRA combatants defected to ZANLA due to operational clashes following the deaths of Moyo and Mangena. Others, it is alleged, joined Abel Muzorewa's Security Force Auxiliaries (SFA)/Pfumo reVanhu. While the deaths of key leaders undoubtedly affected morale and operations—as would be expected in any military movement—there is no evidence that these defections happened at the scale suggested.
John Padbury, a former Rhodesian Special Branch detective inspector who commanded-PFumo reVanhu in Hurungwe, recently told me that he never encountered any cases of ZPRA defections to the SFAs in his operational area. The supposed link between ZPRA desertions and leadership disputes seems to have been fabricated to retroactively justify the defections of ZPRA combatants at assembly points in 1980, which occurred for entirely different reasons. The author explicitly states that what happened in 1980 was "nothing new".
This claim is an insult to the hundreds of ZPRA cadres who disappeared from assembly points or were abducted from their army stations after 1980. Many of these early victims of state violence were arrested, tortured, or even executed by the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). These crimes, sanctioned at the highest levels of the ZNA, are well-documented. Among those implicated is the decorated Josiah Tungamirai.
The article also attempts to frame war crimes such as rape as acts committed exclusively by ZPRA combatants against Shona women. While it is true that abuses, including torture and killings, occurred during the war—as documented in Zimbabwean scholarship—the author's selective framing is misleading. Research has shown that rape was used as a weapon of war by both ZPRA and ZANLA combatants. Numerous accounts, including testimonies from former fighters, highlight incidents of sexual violence in guerrilla camps, often perpetrated by senior commanders. To single out ZPRA for these crimes while ignoring ZANLA's well-documented abuses is academically dishonest.
Lastly, the article's title suggests an in-depth exploration of assassinations within ZPRA, but this theme is only touched on sporadically. Instead, the main objective appears to be discrediting ZAPU and its military wing. Far from an academic analysis, the article reads like a work of rumour-mongering, where stereotypes and pre-existing biases are dressed up as scholarly arguments.
The level of disinformation and misinformation in this article raises serious questions about the quality of the peer-review process at the Taylor & Francis journal, which allowed some of its fabrications to pass as academic arguments.
The entire article is built on the premise that ZPRA - referred to by the author as ZIPRA - was a chaotic and ineffective organisation that failed to achieve its objectives during the liberation war. The author then works backwards to justify this conclusion, making numerous claims to explain ZPRA's alleged inefficiency. These claims largely revolve around accusations against ZAPU and ZPRA leaders and combatants, portraying them as either criminal or deliberately undermining the liberation struggle. Worse still, the article is littered with excitable, activist-style language rather than solid, irrefutable evidence to support these allegations.
As a result, the final product reads more like a Tsikamutanda Newsletter than a serious academic piece. Many of the article's damaging claims are presented as fact, yet they are clearly opinions designed to justify pre-existing biases against ZAPU in general and the Ndebele ethnic group in particular. Below are some of the most outrageous assertions made in the article.
First, the author boldly claims that ZAPU stalwarts Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo, Charles Sotsha Ngwenya (also known as John Dube or JD), and ZPRA commander Rogers Alfred Nikita Mangena were assassinated for plotting a coup against Joshua Nkomo. To lend credibility to this claim—or at least to cloak it in moral concern—the author suggests that their deaths weakened ZPRA's transition to conventional warfare in the late 1970s. The assassinations, he argues, compromised ZAPU/ZPRA's 'combat effectiveness …during a crucial phase of the armed struggle', ultimately leading to its failure to overthrow the Rhodesian regime through full-scale conventional warfare.
The second claim, closely linked to the first, is that Nkomo 'surround[ed] himself with loyalists [and] appointed mostly fellow Kalanga/Ndebele people to senior positions within ZAPU, to the detriment of the Shona, most of whom were Zezuru'. To support this, the author makes the factually incorrect claim that Nikita Mangena was Shona. According to the article, Mangena was not only killed for his alleged coup plot but also to make way for Ndebele/Kalanga leadership within ZPRA. Lookout Masuku's succession of Mangena is then framed as a deliberate move by Nkomo to ensure that only Kalanga or Ndebele loyalists led his movement.
The claim that Mangena was Shona is not only false but also an insult to the readers of the journal, as it is a fabricated assertion used to justify the pre-existing narrative that Nkomo purged ZAPU and ZPRA of Shona leadership. A simple background check would have clarified Mangena's ethnic identity—though, in any case, his ethnicity should not even be relevant when discussing his assassination. The author further claims that Ambrose Mutinhiri was overlooked as Mangena's successor solely because he was Shona.
A related falsehood in the article is the claim that Shona guerrillas believed "ZAPU was an instrument for advancing the supremacy of the Ndebele ethnic group over the Shona majority" and consequently defected to ZANLA. To reinforce this, the author alleges that ZPRA guerrillas, possibly influenced by their Marxist ideology, "hated members of the vapostori sect", humiliated them by forcing them to drink the illicit brew sikokiyana, and routinely raped women in Shona villages.
Given ZAPU's historically diverse leadership, I have tried to understand the basis of this claim. Did the author even attempt to verify whether any guerrilla ever made such statements? Was he unaware that desertions between ZPRA and ZANLA were not uncommon? Moreover, what ideology did ZANLA cadres follow if not Marxism?
The article further claims that ZPRA combatants defected to ZANLA due to operational clashes following the deaths of Moyo and Mangena. Others, it is alleged, joined Abel Muzorewa's Security Force Auxiliaries (SFA)/Pfumo reVanhu. While the deaths of key leaders undoubtedly affected morale and operations—as would be expected in any military movement—there is no evidence that these defections happened at the scale suggested.
John Padbury, a former Rhodesian Special Branch detective inspector who commanded-PFumo reVanhu in Hurungwe, recently told me that he never encountered any cases of ZPRA defections to the SFAs in his operational area. The supposed link between ZPRA desertions and leadership disputes seems to have been fabricated to retroactively justify the defections of ZPRA combatants at assembly points in 1980, which occurred for entirely different reasons. The author explicitly states that what happened in 1980 was "nothing new".
This claim is an insult to the hundreds of ZPRA cadres who disappeared from assembly points or were abducted from their army stations after 1980. Many of these early victims of state violence were arrested, tortured, or even executed by the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). These crimes, sanctioned at the highest levels of the ZNA, are well-documented. Among those implicated is the decorated Josiah Tungamirai.
The article also attempts to frame war crimes such as rape as acts committed exclusively by ZPRA combatants against Shona women. While it is true that abuses, including torture and killings, occurred during the war—as documented in Zimbabwean scholarship—the author's selective framing is misleading. Research has shown that rape was used as a weapon of war by both ZPRA and ZANLA combatants. Numerous accounts, including testimonies from former fighters, highlight incidents of sexual violence in guerrilla camps, often perpetrated by senior commanders. To single out ZPRA for these crimes while ignoring ZANLA's well-documented abuses is academically dishonest.
Lastly, the article's title suggests an in-depth exploration of assassinations within ZPRA, but this theme is only touched on sporadically. Instead, the main objective appears to be discrediting ZAPU and its military wing. Far from an academic analysis, the article reads like a work of rumour-mongering, where stereotypes and pre-existing biases are dressed up as scholarly arguments.
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