Opinion / Columnist
Why Zimbabwe's parliamentary-elected president proposal is not the same as the South African model
2 hrs ago |
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Where some thrive by creating darkness, the illumination of truth is essential.
As political discourse in Zimbabwe gathers momentum around the possibility of further constitutional amendments, a specific proposal has taken center stage: shifting away from the direct public election of the President to a system where the head of state is chosen by Parliament.
If you value my social justice advocacy and writing, please consider a financial contribution to keep it going. Contact me on WhatsApp: +263 715 667 700 or Email: mbofana.tendairuben73@gmail.com
In promoting this potential pivot, Zimbabwean authorities have widely disseminated the narrative that this change aligns with "modern African standards," frequently pointing to neighboring South Africa as the exemplar of this democratic maturity.
On the surface, the comparison seems neat: South Africa's Parliament elects its President, so Zimbabwe doing the same must be a step toward similar modernization.
However, this superficial similarity masks fundamental, structural differences between the two nations' electoral architectures.
To equate the South African model with the proposed Zimbabwean adaptation is to ignore the crucial democratic scaffolding that makes the former function, scaffolding that is largely absent in the Zimbabwean context.
The core of the deception lies in ignoring how the respective parliaments are composed.
South Africa operates under a pure Proportional Representation (PR) party-list system.
When South Africans head to the polls, they do not vote for an individual presidential candidate, nor do they vote for a local Member of Parliament in a specific constituency.
Instead, they cast a single vote for a political party.
The total number of seats a party receives in the National Assembly is directly proportional to its share of the national vote.
If a party wins 50% of the popular vote, it receives 50% of the parliamentary seats; if it wins 37%, it secures exactly that share.
Once this deeply representative body is constituted, the newly sworn-in MPs elect the President, usually the leader of the majority party or coalition.
This reliance on Proportional Representation is the critical safety valve in the South African system.
It ensures that the parliamentary body electing the President is an accurate mirror of the national political will.
Every vote cast anywhere in the country contributes to a party's parliamentary strength.
Therefore, while the South African President is indirectly elected, their mandate is derived from a parliament that genuinely reflects the collective voice of the electorate.
Minorities are represented, and fabricating a parliamentary majority without a corresponding popular majority is mathematically impossible.
The system forces consensus-building, increasingly evidenced by the rise of coalition politics in South Africa, which acts as a check on executive power.
Conversely, the proposed Zimbabwean shift intends to graft a parliamentary election mechanism onto an electoral system that is functionally antithetical to South Africa's.
While Zimbabwe uses a mixed system, its parliamentary composition is heavily determined by First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) constituency battles.
In FPTP, the "winner takes all" in each specific district, regardless of the margin of victory.
This system is notoriously known for creating "manufactured majorities," where a ruling party can secure a constitutional supermajority in parliament with significantly less than that share of the popular vote, simply by winning many constituencies by narrow margins while opposition votes are concentrated in fewer areas.
If Zimbabwe moves to parliament electing the President without abandoning FPTP in favor of pure Proportional Representation, the democratic deficit becomes immediately apparent.
Under current conditions, the ruling party, ZANU-PF, consistently maintains a dominant parliamentary majority that often exceeds its popular vote share.
By shifting the presidential vote to this body, the process is effectively insulated from the unpredictable "risk" of a national popular vote.
A party could theoretically lose popular support nationwide yet retain enough constituency seats to easily install its leader as President.
In this scenario, Parliament does not act as an independent electoral college reflecting the nation's will, but rather as a rubber stamp for the incumbent party leadership.
Furthermore, the comparison ignores the vastly different political cultures and institutional checks regarding parliamentary accountability.
In South Africa, the parliamentary election of the president is balanced by robust mechanisms for removal, including motions of no confidence which are regularly utilized by opposition parties to hold the executive accountable.
While the African National Congress has historically used its majority to defeat these motions, the process itself is a vibrant site of democratic contestation, aided by an independent judiciary and strong civic institutions.
In Zimbabwe, the historical relationship between the executive and the legislature has been characterized by executive dominance.
The whip system is enforced rigidly, and dissent within the ruling party is rarely tolerated.
Transferring the power to choose the president into this environment, without the prerequisite reforms to ensure parliament is truly independent and representative, is a recipe for democratic regression.
It transforms the presidential selection process from a national referendum on leadership into an internal party management exercise.
Ultimately, the South African system works not simply because parliament chooses the president, but because of how that parliament is chosen.
The legitimacy of South Africa's indirect election rests entirely on the foundation of Proportional Representation.
By cherry-picking the final step of the South African process—the parliamentary vote—while ignoring the foundational element of proportional representation that gives that vote its democratic legitimacy, proponents of the Zimbabwean amendment are engaging in a sophisticated sleight of hand.
Adopting the mechanism without the accompanying democratic infrastructure is not modernization; it is a tactic to consolidate power by removing the uncertainty of direct accountability to the ordinary voter.
© Tendai Ruben Mbofana is a social justice advocate and writer. To directly receive his articles please join his WhatsApp Channel on: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VaqprWCIyPtRnKpkHe08
As political discourse in Zimbabwe gathers momentum around the possibility of further constitutional amendments, a specific proposal has taken center stage: shifting away from the direct public election of the President to a system where the head of state is chosen by Parliament.
If you value my social justice advocacy and writing, please consider a financial contribution to keep it going. Contact me on WhatsApp: +263 715 667 700 or Email: mbofana.tendairuben73@gmail.com
In promoting this potential pivot, Zimbabwean authorities have widely disseminated the narrative that this change aligns with "modern African standards," frequently pointing to neighboring South Africa as the exemplar of this democratic maturity.
On the surface, the comparison seems neat: South Africa's Parliament elects its President, so Zimbabwe doing the same must be a step toward similar modernization.
However, this superficial similarity masks fundamental, structural differences between the two nations' electoral architectures.
To equate the South African model with the proposed Zimbabwean adaptation is to ignore the crucial democratic scaffolding that makes the former function, scaffolding that is largely absent in the Zimbabwean context.
The core of the deception lies in ignoring how the respective parliaments are composed.
South Africa operates under a pure Proportional Representation (PR) party-list system.
When South Africans head to the polls, they do not vote for an individual presidential candidate, nor do they vote for a local Member of Parliament in a specific constituency.
Instead, they cast a single vote for a political party.
The total number of seats a party receives in the National Assembly is directly proportional to its share of the national vote.
If a party wins 50% of the popular vote, it receives 50% of the parliamentary seats; if it wins 37%, it secures exactly that share.
Once this deeply representative body is constituted, the newly sworn-in MPs elect the President, usually the leader of the majority party or coalition.
This reliance on Proportional Representation is the critical safety valve in the South African system.
It ensures that the parliamentary body electing the President is an accurate mirror of the national political will.
Every vote cast anywhere in the country contributes to a party's parliamentary strength.
Therefore, while the South African President is indirectly elected, their mandate is derived from a parliament that genuinely reflects the collective voice of the electorate.
Minorities are represented, and fabricating a parliamentary majority without a corresponding popular majority is mathematically impossible.
The system forces consensus-building, increasingly evidenced by the rise of coalition politics in South Africa, which acts as a check on executive power.
Conversely, the proposed Zimbabwean shift intends to graft a parliamentary election mechanism onto an electoral system that is functionally antithetical to South Africa's.
In FPTP, the "winner takes all" in each specific district, regardless of the margin of victory.
This system is notoriously known for creating "manufactured majorities," where a ruling party can secure a constitutional supermajority in parliament with significantly less than that share of the popular vote, simply by winning many constituencies by narrow margins while opposition votes are concentrated in fewer areas.
If Zimbabwe moves to parliament electing the President without abandoning FPTP in favor of pure Proportional Representation, the democratic deficit becomes immediately apparent.
Under current conditions, the ruling party, ZANU-PF, consistently maintains a dominant parliamentary majority that often exceeds its popular vote share.
By shifting the presidential vote to this body, the process is effectively insulated from the unpredictable "risk" of a national popular vote.
A party could theoretically lose popular support nationwide yet retain enough constituency seats to easily install its leader as President.
In this scenario, Parliament does not act as an independent electoral college reflecting the nation's will, but rather as a rubber stamp for the incumbent party leadership.
Furthermore, the comparison ignores the vastly different political cultures and institutional checks regarding parliamentary accountability.
In South Africa, the parliamentary election of the president is balanced by robust mechanisms for removal, including motions of no confidence which are regularly utilized by opposition parties to hold the executive accountable.
While the African National Congress has historically used its majority to defeat these motions, the process itself is a vibrant site of democratic contestation, aided by an independent judiciary and strong civic institutions.
In Zimbabwe, the historical relationship between the executive and the legislature has been characterized by executive dominance.
The whip system is enforced rigidly, and dissent within the ruling party is rarely tolerated.
Transferring the power to choose the president into this environment, without the prerequisite reforms to ensure parliament is truly independent and representative, is a recipe for democratic regression.
It transforms the presidential selection process from a national referendum on leadership into an internal party management exercise.
Ultimately, the South African system works not simply because parliament chooses the president, but because of how that parliament is chosen.
The legitimacy of South Africa's indirect election rests entirely on the foundation of Proportional Representation.
By cherry-picking the final step of the South African process—the parliamentary vote—while ignoring the foundational element of proportional representation that gives that vote its democratic legitimacy, proponents of the Zimbabwean amendment are engaging in a sophisticated sleight of hand.
Adopting the mechanism without the accompanying democratic infrastructure is not modernization; it is a tactic to consolidate power by removing the uncertainty of direct accountability to the ordinary voter.
© Tendai Ruben Mbofana is a social justice advocate and writer. To directly receive his articles please join his WhatsApp Channel on: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VaqprWCIyPtRnKpkHe08
Source - Tendai Ruben Mbofana
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