The Egyptian revolution (January 25–February 11, 2011)

In Egypt, President Mubarak made the mistake of declaring January 25, 2011, "police day." A celebration of the police who had been brutalizing and terrorizing the people? It was too much to countenance. Drawing inspiration from the ouster of Ben Ali in neighboring Tunisia, a group of young pro-democracy activists - called the Revolutionary Youth Movement - decided to replicate the accomplishments of the Tunisian experiment, and they made Mubarak's "police day" their "the day of rage."
 
The established opposition parties in Egypt had been feckless, divided, and constantly feuding, but these new plotters and organizers were from the youth wings of the opposition movements. The following account of their strategy is culled from the February 11 edition of the Wall Street Journal.
 
The protests were begun by a group of about a dozen young people, including representatives from six youth movements connected to opposition political parties, groups advocating labor rights, and the Muslim Brotherhood. "They met daily for two weeks in the cramped living room of the mother of Ziad al-Alimi, a leading youth organizer for Mr. El Baradei's campaign group."19 They chose 20 protest sites that were usually connected to mosques and were located in densely populated neighborhoods. The idea was that such a large number of scattered sites would strain security forces and draw larger numbers of people. The group called publicly for protests at those sites but did not make public the twenty-first site they had chosen. There were other organizers as well, including Wael Ghonim, the Google executive. However, this youth group seems to have masterminded the uprising at Tahrir Square.

Three days before the protest, the youth plotters slept away from home, fearing that the police might pick them up in the middle of the night. They also stopped using their cell phones, fearing that they might be monitored, and used those belonging to relatives and friends instead. They sent small teams to do reconnaissance on the secret twenty-first site: the Badaq al-Dakrour neighborhood's Hayiss Sweet Shop. It was in a working-class slum area; the organizers knew that the protest's success would depend on the participation of ordinary Egyptians who had no access to the Internet. "On January 25, security forces predict-ably deployed by the thousands at each of the announced demonstration sites."20 Then four field commanders converged on the twenty-first site and mobilized the people to march unchecked by police to Tahrir Square (Liberation Square). The occupation of Liberation Square was a huge victory for the revolution.
 
A visibly disturbed Mubarak sent his police goons to beat up, teargas, and douse the protesters with water cannons. They did not budge. Then he sent in the military: a column of tanks but, as in the Philippines in 1986, the protesters formed a human chain to block them. Mubarak next sent F-16 fighter jets to buzz the crowd. It did not work. Things began to turn in favor of the protesters when the army chief announced that the Egyptian military would not fire on its citizens. This announcement emboldened the protesters, who carried some of the soldiers high on their shoulders. A desperate Mubarak tried some of his old tricks. He suddenly withdrew the police from the streets and organized thugs on horses and camels to beat up and shoot the demonstrators. Some of the captured thugs were found to be carrying police ID cards. When he shut down the Internet, young Egyptians found alternative ways of communicating.
 
On January 28, 2011, Mubarak sacked his government and formed a new one. He hastily announced new political reforms, pledged not to seek re-election in September 2011, and denied allegations that he was grooming his son, Gamal, to succeed him. (Ah, the coconut boogie again.) He indicated to Egyptians that he would like to finish his constitutional term and said that if he left, there would be chaos because the Muslim Brotherhood would take over. But his rants were greeted with the chants, "Leave, Leave, Leave!" and "Mubarak, Your Plane is Ready."
 
On January 29, 2011, Mubarak appointed a vice president for the first time in 30 years. Threats were made against the street protesters, but yet people more came to Tahrir Square. When it became apparent that the Mubarak regime was playing for time, I sent a message to pro-democracy activists via Twitter, Facebook, and e-mail telling them to ratchet up the pressure by taking control of state television (as in the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan); the airport (as in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and in Bangkok on November 27, 2008); and parliament (as in Hungary in 1956 and Indonesia in 1998). On February 9, protesters pulled out a feint: They announced plans to seize state television, which was across Tahrir Square. When security forces deployed heavily to guard it, they changed tack and marched to the entrance of the parliament building.
 
On February 10, in a highly anticipated speech, Mubarak announced that he would not step down and would remain in office until September, when his term would end. The crowd was enraged and vowed to show up at the square in even greater numbers. The military, ever attuned to the demands of the protesters, pushed Mubarak aside, and on February 11, he announced that he was stepping down and handing over power to a Supreme Military Council. Tahrir Square exploded in one giant jubilation and celebration. In all, over 300 lives were lost in the violent upheaval.