A presentation on The Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No.3) Bill, 2026

𝘈 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘰 𝘢 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘶𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 - 𝘪𝘯 𝘮𝘺 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸 - 𝘣𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘯 𝘣𝘺 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘸𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘶𝘦; 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘩𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘢𝘴𝘦, 𝘪𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘰𝘯 𝘤𝘢𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘨𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘪𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘡𝘪𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘣𝘸𝘦 (𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘕𝘰. 3) 𝘉𝘪𝘭𝘭, 2026; 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘵 𝘭𝘢𝘴𝘵 𝘸𝘦𝘦𝘬 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘨𝘢𝘻𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘸𝘦𝘦𝘬 𝘉𝘶𝘵 𝘣𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘐 𝘶𝘯𝘱𝘢𝘤𝘬 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘉𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘭𝘦𝘵 𝘮𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘬𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘰𝘣𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘐 𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘴𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘪𝘯 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘺 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘦𝘹𝘵𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘱𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘪𝘴 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘦; 𝘣𝘶𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘶𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴; 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘺𝘰𝘯𝘦  -  𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺. 

𝘛𝘩𝘢𝘵'𝘴 w𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘮𝘢𝘬𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘮 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭, 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘪𝘳𝘴𝘵 𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘤𝘦. 𝘕𝘰 𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘴 𝘢 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘺𝘦𝘳 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘰𝘯 𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘶𝘦𝘴. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘪𝘴 𝘶𝘯𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯 𝘫𝘶𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘪𝘭𝘦.  𝘔𝘰𝘤𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘳 𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘭𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘦𝘪𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘣𝘦𝘤𝘢𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘱𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘥 𝘭𝘢𝘸 𝘰𝘳 𝘣𝘦𝘤𝘢𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘴𝘵𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘦𝘥 𝘭𝘢𝘸 𝘪𝘴 𝘦𝘹𝘵𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘭𝘺 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘩. 𝘖𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘸𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘺𝘦𝘴, 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘴𝘦, 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘯 𝘪𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘥𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯 𝘢𝘨𝘳𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯; 𝘣𝘶𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘶𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘭𝘺 𝘶𝘯𝘯𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘯 𝘪𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘶𝘦𝘴, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘣𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘤𝘢𝘯 𝘥𝘰 𝘪𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘯 𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘫𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘭𝘪𝘬𝘦 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘺𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘦𝘭𝘴𝘦. 

𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘣𝘰𝘵𝘵𝘰𝘮 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘪𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘶𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘣𝘺 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘮𝘶𝘭𝘵𝘪𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘪𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺  - 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘺 𝘩𝘶𝘮𝘢𝘯 𝘴𝘵𝘶𝘥𝘺 𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘢𝘷𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘪𝘴 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘰𝘭𝘷𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘮𝘢𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨. 𝘈 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘺𝘦𝘳 𝘸𝘩𝘰 𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘶𝘦𝘴 𝘣𝘺 𝘳𝘢𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘰𝘳 𝘥𝘪𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘮𝘢 𝘩𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘣𝘭𝘦𝘮, 𝘮𝘢𝘺𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘯 𝘪𝘯𝘧𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦𝘹. 𝘉𝘦𝘤𝘢𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘶𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘺𝘰𝘯𝘦, 𝘢 𝘨𝘰𝘰𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘳 𝘢 𝘨𝘰𝘰𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘔𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘩𝘢𝘴 𝘴𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘺𝘰𝘯𝘦. 

Back to today's discussion, and as one among others who have been intimately involved in constitutional reviews over the last 26 years - notably the people driven exercise that produced the 2000 draft Constitution prepared by the Constitutional Commission; and the 2013 compromise between Zanu PF and the MDC formations that produced the current, Constitution, it my considered view that the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill, 2026 represents a profound recalibration of Zimbabwe's democratic and constitutional architecture. 

The foundational question of my intervention is based on this question: what is the motivation or mischief that the Bill is addressing? 

In my view, the mischief being addressed is twofold:

One is the perpetual conflict mode arising from the country's system of electing the President introduced in 1987 in anticipation of the establishment of a one party, which never was.

Section 328(7) provides that "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an amendment to a term-limit provision, the effect of which is to extend the length of time that a person may hold or occupy any public office, does not apply in relation to any person who held or occupied that office, or an equivalent office, at any time before the amendment. 

The operative phrase here is that the affected amendment must demonstrably be "a term limit provision"; not any other provision but a term limit provision.

The distinguishing feature of a term limit provision is that it a discernible limit or cap, that no one can see and understand.

In this connection, subsection one of 328 provides that a term-limit provision: "means a provision of this Constitution which limits the length of time that a person may hold or occupy a public office". For a clause or section of the Constitution to qualify as a "term limit provision", it must expressly and unambiguously put a limit or cap on the "time that a person may hold or occupy a public office". If there's no limit or cap in the provision being looked at, then that clause or section is not a term limit provision; and section 328(7) does not apply to it.

Using dictionary definitions of the words "term" and "period", the Constitutional Court in the landmark case of Marx Mupungu v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & 6 Others held that: "a term" is defined as "a fixed or limited period for which something, for example, office, imprisonment or investment, lasts or is intended to last", while a "period" is defined to mean "a particular length or portion of time". 

In the light of these definitions, a term is a period of time, which is ordinarily measured by using a particular unit of time, and which has a known beginning and a determinable end. 

The operative word is that, unlike a period or duration which may be subject to contingencies, a term is fixed by a known beginning and a determinable end". 

Therefore, a term limit is a cap on that known beginning and determinable end. 

As such, term limit provisions place a measurable lid on tenure with unyielding limits or caps like "non-renewable term," "renewable once only," "not more than two terms," or totals such as "up to a maximum of two terms" or "renewable once subject to competence and performance." All term limit provisions in the Constitution are phrased in this to make clear what the limit.  Sections 95(2)(b) lack such phrasing, for the simple reason that they are no term limits. This should be simple to follow and understand, unless one is pushing a political agenda with an axe to grind: a term limit provision must have a clear limiter or cap.

Fifthly, and lastly, the following stands to reason from the foregoing: 

- the Bill does not alter or change the presidential term-limit in section 91(2);

- there's no third term or the repeal of the presidential term limit;

- there's no extension of the presidential term which can be done only in section 91(2, which is not altered by the amendments;

- Sections 95(2)(b) and 143(1) - which have been in the Constitution in one form or another and have defined and governed every general election since 1980  -  without ever functioning as term limit provisions (because they're not) are only election cycle provisions, which do not belong to the protected category of term limit provisions that requires a referendum. 

If the two sections are term limit provisions, that means the former President Mugabe ignored the term limits for 37 years, a proposition that would be illogical and outrageous because sections 29 and 63 in the former Constitution; and 95(2)(b)(b) and 143(1) are the same in form and substance, as election cycles and not term limit provisions.

- There's no implication arising from section 328(7) because it only affects term limit provisions, and no term limit provision is amended by the Bill;

- the Bill only lengthens the election cycle from five to seven years to break the toxicity of a permanent election mode in between elections; it's a Sabbath solution and is practiced in a number of other jurisdictions;

- The Bill is not about the President; it is about the Presidency and Parliament, whose durations or election cycles is lengthening  -  as institutions  -  and thus impacts all elective positions in Parliament and the Presidency; 

- For the avoidance of doubt to understand that section 95(2)(b) is not a term limit provision affecting the President, consider this: a presidential successor under section 101  -  following say a resignation, removal, or death of the incumbent after say two years I office  -  serves only the remaining period of the term of the election cycle; this ensures continuity of the cycle without restarting the clock for a fresh term. 

The same is true in connection with parliamentary by-elections following a vacancy; in line with parliamentary term of office in section 143(1): they fill only the remaining election cycle time, one does not win a by-election and demand a five-year term.

- Parliamentary election of the President will shield the office from the ethnic divisions, polarisation, and paralysing disputes that have bedevilled presidential elections since their advent in 1990; and will promote and strengthen national unity to give everyone and all communities a voice in national governance through their representatives in Parliament in line with section 3(2)(a) which provides that "The principles of good governance, which bind the State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level, include  -  a multi-party democratic political system. 

The direct election of the President is in direct conflict with this founding value and principle of good governance enshrined under section 3 of the Constitution.

- The shift from shorter five-year election cycles is not on the constitutional agenda only in Zimbabwe; is being considered in a number of countries. 

Guinea adopted a new constitution on 21 September 2025, which lengthened the presidential term from five to seven years, renewable once. 

It is my considered view that President Mnangagwa and his Cabinet deserve unqualified national commendation for the Bill, on account of the progressive provisions in the Bill. In advancing this bold initiative, he and the Government have signalled a historic transformation that honourably reconciles Zimbabwe's troubled past with a promising future of real developmental not just beyond 2030, but also beyond personal interest. 

The Bill is an example of constitutional reforms that have something for everyone.

I thank you.