Opinion / Columnist
The politics of water in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
19 hrs ago | Views
Water has always been an important and valuable resource to humanity, which partly explains why most great civilisations were situated near water bodies. The value of water is much more amplified when said resource is scarce.
Much has been said about the current water shortages in the City of Bulawayo which have led to water rationing periods exceeding 172-hours to manage the demand (A practice I still believe causes more harm than good). However, water shortages in the city are not a new occurrence, which begs the question; Why do we always have water shortages in the city? Why are the authorities not doing something to rectify this? A recent webinar with the City of Bulawayo (Cob) and other interested stakeholders revealed that there are several short to medium-term plans that the City will implement soon, however one could sense that this is more than a technical problem.
This led me to revisit an essay I once wrote for one of my Master's courses on the politics of water which I have decided to share on this platform. In this article, I will discuss how water has often been used as a political tool in the City of Bulawayo. I will borrow ideas from Ranger (2007), Musemwa (2008) and Makwara and Tavuyanago (2012) to chronologically convey how water supply in the CoB has always been politically motivated and regulated.
Musemwa (2008) captures how, water was already an important political talking point as early as when the British settlers controlled Bulawayo, after the invasion of Matabeleland. This is still true in post-independence present-day Bulawayo.
Unlike other cities in Zimbabwe (then called Rhodesia), the control of the water supply did not initially rest with the city council but lay in private hands. The then "custodians" of the territory, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) awarded the Bulawayo Water Company (BWC) the right to supply water to the town of Bulawayo for 25 years after which it could be renewed subject to a thorough evaluation (Musemwa, 2008).
The company's first dam and by extension, Bulawayo's first water supply dam, was on the Matsheumhlope River on a farm in Hillside. A total of three dams were built and were to be known as the Hillside dams which had a capacity of 41 million gallons (approx. 187 thousand cubic meters) of water. These dams were located on the Hillside Kopjes so that the water system would not require pumping but would take advantage of gravity. Four service reservoirs were also constructed each with the capacity to supply the town with 4 weeks of water supply. However, due to the cost of transporting materials and the fact that the dams were built in a poor catchment area, that coupled with the dam not being properly built, the white residents of Bulawayo began to voice their displeasure at the company. This was exacerbated by the periods of low rainfall that followed. The Bulawayo City Council (BCC) saw this as a chance to take over the water supply from private hands. In 1913 the municipality sought to buy the BWC's undertakings in water and electricity, however, they failed to agree on a price. Thus, after legal counsel, they decided to start their own company after it was evident that the rate-payers supported this move after years of having to deal with the BWC. However, due to the 25-year concession granted to the BWC, the BCC could not legally set up a parallel water company and lost the lawsuit filed against the BWC. In 1924, citing the importance of water and electricity for the future development of the town and the numerous health concerns that had arisen, the then Mayor proposed to expropriate the water company's undertakings for a considerable sum. A bill was passed that allowed expropriation by the City and thus the city control gained control of the water.
Ranger (2007), Musemwa, (2008) both argue that while the reasons BCC used to take control of the water were health-based, the motivating force was largely the desire for absolute political control. This desire continued up to the 1930s when the Central Government sought to regain control of the city through control of its water. The white residents of Bulawayo fought to maintain their independence as a municipality and to not concede to the demand of the central government to improve the living conditions in Makhokhoba township (a native location within the city precinct) (Ranger, 2007).
Although things were comparatively quiet in the 1950s to the 1960s, a proverbial storm was brewing in a dry city. After the municipality had taken over the water supply, it had steadily increased the number of supply dams in better catchment areas. However, a revised Water Act of 1976 meant that no urban council could engage in the bulk water supply. They also could not collect revenue for water outside their city limits. Furthermore, this Act prioritised commercial white farmers, further entrenching the water inequality between users, especially the native African small-scale farmers. The outcome of this Act was total control by the state. While the city had embarked on constructing a dam every 10 years, none were built from that period, except for the Mtshabezi Dam that was built without consulting the BCC.
Post-independence, which happened in 1980, the Bulawayo City Council largely comprised of members of the ZAPU party in a government that was ZANU (These were the two main political parties post-1980), and thus the struggle for the control of Bulawayo continued.
The new Zimbabwean government initially inherited the 1976 Water Act. This Act was only reformed in 1998 with a new Act that sought to address the inequalities in water supply created by a colonial government via the 1976 Water act. The 1998 Water act abolished permanent water rights and prioritised water allocation and introduced renewable water permits to allow for the equitable access to water.
After a shift in the political landscape that resulted in the urban areas voting for the new opposition party (MDC) in the 2000 general election, The ZANU-PF controlled central government directed ZINWA (Zimbabwe National Water Authority), an entity created by the 1998 act to manage the bulk water, to take over water management in urban areas including Harare in 2005 and Bulawayo in 2007. Ranger, (2007) suggests that this was a move to starve the opposition of any revenue they could get from water sales and to effectively control these “unruly” urban areas. Of cause, ZINWA was poorly prepared to manage all the urban cities water and things began to fall apart. ZINWA's failure in managing water in urban areas is considered by some scholars, such as Makwara and Tavuyanago, (2012) to have been a significant contributing factor in the spread of cholera and typhoid that led to over 4000 deaths in the nation.
Due to increased water shortages, Bulawayo City Council pleaded with the government to fund more water augmentation projects to relieve the city in times of droughts, which are frequent in the area. These pleas unsurprisingly fell on deaf ears. It also did not help that the nation was already undergoing economic turmoil. The Bulawayo residents continually resisted this take over by ZINWA, and as with the earlier 1924 council, they were the voice that enabled the local council to take back control of its water. This was largely due to the ZANU-PF government fear of a humiliating defeat in the 2008 elections.
This power struggle is what I've been sensing over the last 8 years that I've been studying water engineering. You read about it when there are disagreements between the Central government and the BCC.
This discussion sought to shed light on how water has been used as a political tool throughout the City's history to such an extent that it is nearly impossible to discuss water issues in Bulawayo devoid of politics.
References
Makwara, E. C. and Tavuyanago, B. (2012) 'Water Woes in Zimbabwe's Urban Areas in the Midst of Plenty: 2000 - Present', European Journal of Sustainable Development, 1(2), pp. 151–180.
Musemwa, M. (2008) 'Early struggles over water: From private to public water utility in the City of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1894-1924', Journal of Southern African Studies, 34(4), pp. 881–898. doi: 10.1080/03057070802456813.
Ranger, T. O. (2007) 'City Versus State in Zimbabwe: Colonial Antecedents of the Current Crisis', Journal of Eastern African Studies. Taylor & Francis Group, 1(2), pp. 161–192. doi: 10.1080/17531050701452390.
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Craig Tinashe Tanyanyiwa
PhD | Regional Manager (Southern Africa) at Wetskills Foundation | Netherlands Young Expert Programme (YEP) Fellow
Much has been said about the current water shortages in the City of Bulawayo which have led to water rationing periods exceeding 172-hours to manage the demand (A practice I still believe causes more harm than good). However, water shortages in the city are not a new occurrence, which begs the question; Why do we always have water shortages in the city? Why are the authorities not doing something to rectify this? A recent webinar with the City of Bulawayo (Cob) and other interested stakeholders revealed that there are several short to medium-term plans that the City will implement soon, however one could sense that this is more than a technical problem.
This led me to revisit an essay I once wrote for one of my Master's courses on the politics of water which I have decided to share on this platform. In this article, I will discuss how water has often been used as a political tool in the City of Bulawayo. I will borrow ideas from Ranger (2007), Musemwa (2008) and Makwara and Tavuyanago (2012) to chronologically convey how water supply in the CoB has always been politically motivated and regulated.
Musemwa (2008) captures how, water was already an important political talking point as early as when the British settlers controlled Bulawayo, after the invasion of Matabeleland. This is still true in post-independence present-day Bulawayo.
Unlike other cities in Zimbabwe (then called Rhodesia), the control of the water supply did not initially rest with the city council but lay in private hands. The then "custodians" of the territory, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) awarded the Bulawayo Water Company (BWC) the right to supply water to the town of Bulawayo for 25 years after which it could be renewed subject to a thorough evaluation (Musemwa, 2008).
The company's first dam and by extension, Bulawayo's first water supply dam, was on the Matsheumhlope River on a farm in Hillside. A total of three dams were built and were to be known as the Hillside dams which had a capacity of 41 million gallons (approx. 187 thousand cubic meters) of water. These dams were located on the Hillside Kopjes so that the water system would not require pumping but would take advantage of gravity. Four service reservoirs were also constructed each with the capacity to supply the town with 4 weeks of water supply. However, due to the cost of transporting materials and the fact that the dams were built in a poor catchment area, that coupled with the dam not being properly built, the white residents of Bulawayo began to voice their displeasure at the company. This was exacerbated by the periods of low rainfall that followed. The Bulawayo City Council (BCC) saw this as a chance to take over the water supply from private hands. In 1913 the municipality sought to buy the BWC's undertakings in water and electricity, however, they failed to agree on a price. Thus, after legal counsel, they decided to start their own company after it was evident that the rate-payers supported this move after years of having to deal with the BWC. However, due to the 25-year concession granted to the BWC, the BCC could not legally set up a parallel water company and lost the lawsuit filed against the BWC. In 1924, citing the importance of water and electricity for the future development of the town and the numerous health concerns that had arisen, the then Mayor proposed to expropriate the water company's undertakings for a considerable sum. A bill was passed that allowed expropriation by the City and thus the city control gained control of the water.
Ranger (2007), Musemwa, (2008) both argue that while the reasons BCC used to take control of the water were health-based, the motivating force was largely the desire for absolute political control. This desire continued up to the 1930s when the Central Government sought to regain control of the city through control of its water. The white residents of Bulawayo fought to maintain their independence as a municipality and to not concede to the demand of the central government to improve the living conditions in Makhokhoba township (a native location within the city precinct) (Ranger, 2007).
Although things were comparatively quiet in the 1950s to the 1960s, a proverbial storm was brewing in a dry city. After the municipality had taken over the water supply, it had steadily increased the number of supply dams in better catchment areas. However, a revised Water Act of 1976 meant that no urban council could engage in the bulk water supply. They also could not collect revenue for water outside their city limits. Furthermore, this Act prioritised commercial white farmers, further entrenching the water inequality between users, especially the native African small-scale farmers. The outcome of this Act was total control by the state. While the city had embarked on constructing a dam every 10 years, none were built from that period, except for the Mtshabezi Dam that was built without consulting the BCC.
Post-independence, which happened in 1980, the Bulawayo City Council largely comprised of members of the ZAPU party in a government that was ZANU (These were the two main political parties post-1980), and thus the struggle for the control of Bulawayo continued.
After a shift in the political landscape that resulted in the urban areas voting for the new opposition party (MDC) in the 2000 general election, The ZANU-PF controlled central government directed ZINWA (Zimbabwe National Water Authority), an entity created by the 1998 act to manage the bulk water, to take over water management in urban areas including Harare in 2005 and Bulawayo in 2007. Ranger, (2007) suggests that this was a move to starve the opposition of any revenue they could get from water sales and to effectively control these “unruly” urban areas. Of cause, ZINWA was poorly prepared to manage all the urban cities water and things began to fall apart. ZINWA's failure in managing water in urban areas is considered by some scholars, such as Makwara and Tavuyanago, (2012) to have been a significant contributing factor in the spread of cholera and typhoid that led to over 4000 deaths in the nation.
Due to increased water shortages, Bulawayo City Council pleaded with the government to fund more water augmentation projects to relieve the city in times of droughts, which are frequent in the area. These pleas unsurprisingly fell on deaf ears. It also did not help that the nation was already undergoing economic turmoil. The Bulawayo residents continually resisted this take over by ZINWA, and as with the earlier 1924 council, they were the voice that enabled the local council to take back control of its water. This was largely due to the ZANU-PF government fear of a humiliating defeat in the 2008 elections.
This power struggle is what I've been sensing over the last 8 years that I've been studying water engineering. You read about it when there are disagreements between the Central government and the BCC.
This discussion sought to shed light on how water has been used as a political tool throughout the City's history to such an extent that it is nearly impossible to discuss water issues in Bulawayo devoid of politics.
References
Makwara, E. C. and Tavuyanago, B. (2012) 'Water Woes in Zimbabwe's Urban Areas in the Midst of Plenty: 2000 - Present', European Journal of Sustainable Development, 1(2), pp. 151–180.
Musemwa, M. (2008) 'Early struggles over water: From private to public water utility in the City of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1894-1924', Journal of Southern African Studies, 34(4), pp. 881–898. doi: 10.1080/03057070802456813.
Ranger, T. O. (2007) 'City Versus State in Zimbabwe: Colonial Antecedents of the Current Crisis', Journal of Eastern African Studies. Taylor & Francis Group, 1(2), pp. 161–192. doi: 10.1080/17531050701452390.
-------------
Craig Tinashe Tanyanyiwa
PhD | Regional Manager (Southern Africa) at Wetskills Foundation | Netherlands Young Expert Programme (YEP) Fellow
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