South Africa begins turbulent new political transition

THERE are two ways of looking at the state of South Africa as 2014 nears its tumultuous end.

The usual glass half empty option is to condemn the country to a continued free-fall both economically and politically, on the assumption that the ruling elite simply cannot change their own bad habits, carefully nurtured and applied over the past 20 years.

As matters deteriorate further, the ruling party will use any means at their disposal to perpetuate their power, privilege and general status quo condemning the country to a Zimbabwe-style future.

A second scenario, however, is much more plausible (and indeed positive), but fraught with difficulties along the way.

In the glass half full option, South Africa enters a period of reckoning - both in terms of its party politics and in terms of its economic policy-making and outcomes. Already, these strains on both crucial fronts are clearly visible, having brewed for many years.

The Zuma administration might in itself reflect a marked decline in accountability and policy-making ability, but it too comes off a post-liberation phase where the bad habits of graft, cronyism and cadre deployment incrementally hampered service delivery, thereby increasing societal deficiencies and dysfunction.

These bad habits die hard. In fact, anyone wishing to undo them by attempting to cut back on public service salary increases, for example, or removing friends and family from senior positions in moribund state-owned-enterprises, runs the risk of eroding their own individual power base.

As South Africa feels a steady decline on multiple fronts - from declining growth rates and the increasing inability of government to pay its bloated workforce to its faltering national airline, state broadcaster, postal services and electricity supply provider - the political will necessary to tackle these deficiencies becomes at once more urgent, yet more risky. We find ourselves at precisely at this stage, 20 years after democracy.

Things will get worse before they get better

There is an old adage: "Things will get worse before they get better" that seems apt in our context. Simply put, they have indeed got worse, but can we hold out some hope they will begin to improve? Have we bottomed out at the lower levels of the cycle of self-inflicted decline, or is the worst not over yet?

Indeed, we might be in for some more shocks to the system but some green shoots are definitely apparent.

South African politics has largely been characterised by a single-dominant political party system since 1994 that, not unlike the National Party (NP) of old, has resulted in both moral and performance decay.

The country has therefore laboured under an artificial period of post-liberation politics in which the emotional recovery from the ravages of apartheid were more important than the performance in government of the post-apartheid elected officials.

Just as the old NP administration held its stranglehold on white minority power through fear and autocratic control, a similar but flipside artificial force of loyalty and gratitude to the liberation movement trumped holding the ANC to account.

When comparing the two periods in South Africa's recent history, South Africans simply have never - electorally anyway - had the ability to effectively hold an incumbent party to account. Both the ANC and NP accomplished this by playing emotional race and fear cards that demanded (and succeeded in securing) almost-blind loyalty instead of encouraging critical analysis.

Today's alliance is a snapshot of domestic South African politics both pre-and-post 1994. The tripartite alliance  ‘broad church' was a necessary vehicle to secure liberation but it has - more recently - been an impediment to governance through the many disparate visions for policy development its component elements hold.

While the intellectual roots of the ANC have been exceptionally strong, the party was perhaps never able to truly shed its liberation baggage as it lurched from a variety of ill-conceived economic plans post-94 through a succession of less-than-successful leaders (with the exception of Mandela).  

Predicated on emotions and recovery from injustices

The post-1994 period was predicated on post-liberation emotions and a recovery from past injustices. And given the inability of Mandela over only five years to cement policy, and the messy state of the Mbeki presidency and deleterious effects of Zuma, it is little wonder that the country has barely enjoyed quality governance in two decades - let alone the previous five.

South Africa's economic and broader delivery malaise today simply reflects the artificial politics of the post-1994 era. Unquestioning voters rewarded the pre-1994 struggle over the post-1994 performance. But when performance reaches a nadir - as is the case across so many essential state entities - both the electorate and individual leaders can be elevated from their collective slumber.

We are precisely entering this phase where governance failure is causing a backlash and loosening the bonds of loyalties that have held the alliance together. It is a typical manifestation of post-liberation politics. And, as the cronyism of the past meets the inefficiencies of the present, attempts to address the decline exacerbate existing frustrations and vulnerabilities.  

What is crucial in the domestic context is the importance of political power as the defining aphrodisiac in the South African political equation. For 20 years, the alliance has held firm. Although ideologically often at loggerheads, having unfettered political power and the many benefits this brings was a powerful glue to keep it intact.

Once again, a more positive take on recent developments suggests that power is less of a binding factor than ever before. Just as voters and leaders incrementally shift from blind loyalty, so they also shift from necessarily having to have power at all costs.

The possible breakaway of the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) and the potential to establish a new political party on the Left shows how ditching the safety and patronage of the corridors of power - however difficult - is increasingly an option.

Devastating effect on parliament

The formation of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) also showed how insiders are increasingly becoming outsiders - and with devastating effect at least within parliament. The Democratic Alliance's (DA's) ability to increase its footprint among black voters in Gauteng equally indicates a looming break with power politics.

The politics of power is therefore giving way to the politics of policy - and that is clearly a positive for the country. A new worker-style party may offer a reasoned policy challenge to the ANC and perhaps also have a strong intellectual base to add gravitas.

The Left may therefore be able to put forward a coherent case for more socialist policies in the country, just as the ANC and DA coalesce around the national development plan (NDP) and its more social-market approach.

The ANC does have one joker up its sleeve - the power to co-opt. Just like Robert Mugabe did with Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front in 1988, a strong ruling party can invoke every nationalistic (and patronage-based) trick in the book to reconcile with old enemies. Indeed, one may argue that the alliance with Nkomo was the real lifeline that cemented Mugabe's rule for the next 25 years.

Any successful co-optation back into the fold will extend the lifespan of the ANC - but somehow, it just seems even beyond the backroom designs of the most Mugabe-esque individuals within the party.  Alliance politics is moving towards fragmentation rather than co-option.

And, it would have to take a universally acclaimed and revered political leader to even consider driving this strategy. Neither the discredited Zuma nor the weakened Ramaphosa would seem to hold any sway in this scenario.

Citizens are becoming more demanding

Ultimately, South Africans are changing. All citizens are becoming more questioning as delivery stagnates and over-long incumbency affects performance and accountability.  

The ignominious latter part of the Mbeki era combined with the Zuma years have created a leadership vacuum that set the country back and further demoralised voters.

Citizens are more urbanised than ever, affording them access to alternative political currents and campaigns. They are more connected than ever tapping into Twitter and Facebook on an ever-increasing uptake of smartphones and the Internet.

As the electorate changes, so do their demands on the elected. And this is positive for enhanced democracy in future.

South African politics is therefore awakening from its slumber and is belatedly entering an era of post-liberation maturation and real transformation.

Policies are beginning to be debated. Personalities are starting to take political risks beyond their protected positions. Parliament - however robust - is at last returning to the centre stage of the political debate, having been deliberately sidelined over a number of years. New political parties are emerging. There is an increasing legitimisation of opposition. This is all pretty positive.

As 2014 ends, so South Africa begins to revitalise its politics. But here's the rub: it has no precedent for each and every new domestic political dynamic it encounters.

Scenes of mayhem

The DA has emulated the obstructionist strategies of the EFF as both vie for the mantle of opposition kingpin. The challenges to decorum within parliament as a result have resulted in unprecedented scenes of mayhem and police intervention.  

A new competitiveness both among and between opposition parties as well as the ANC is testing rules and procedures just as much as the ruling party tries to re-engineer debating protocols within the chamber.

In the election in May, the ANC barely won outright majorities in a number of Gauteng metros and failed to secure 50% in Tshwane, the capital city of the country (as well as the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro in Port Elizabeth).

The party now faces an uphill struggle to win these crucial spheres of local government just as it looks to shed even more percentage points to a Numsa-workers' political movement, and also as a result of the waning of the alliance.  

Local government council chambers will reflect closer elections in future with fewer ANC members and greater (and noisier) opposition benches. It is only a matter of time before city council chambers emulate the raucous events in the National Assembly.

New coalitions starting at local government level may be the defining characteristic of the emergence of new political precedents likely to feature more prominently in post-2019 period.

The period leading to the 2016 local election campaign will be the most testing period for our fledgling democracy yet. How the ANC reacts to fragmentation, disunity and electoral challenges will further impact of the quality of our democracy going forward.

The old NP reacted to most challenges with autocratic efficiency, clamping down on media and free speech as well as individual freedoms while simultaneously unleashing a barrage of propaganda to reassert their authority. No doubt, there are those in the ANC who would like to do the same - but it's just so much more difficult this time.

Still, there is always the temptation to act in a similar vein, as the media bills and changing press ownership has shown.

Any drift to the tactics of old can severely damage the country for decades to come. Fortunately, the ANC is much less cohesive on even considering such a disastrous strategy than the old NP. Its historical commitment to a functioning democracy fortunately militates against any slide towards unfettered state clampdowns.

Country at a critical juncture

Still, South Africans need to realise the critical juncture that the country is at. This is the time when we will set the precedents for the future. When the party of liberation begins to fray at the edges, there is certainly instability to come and new ‘rules of engagement' are likely to be negotiated virtually weekly.

There may be a danger of retreating back into the autocratic ‘laager' but ultimately, the signs for the country are much better. The characteristics of post-liberation political change look like they will take root. There is distinct opportunity for a policy and resultant political realignment, together with more accountability and better performance in the years to come.

But don't expect the ride to be easy. We are in the early days of an evolving process that will see its share of setbacks. It's going to be fasten-your-seatbelt-stuff as elements in the existing order attempt to cling to their power and privileges. It might still get worse, but ultimately it will be better.

This, therefore, is a period to be welcomed rather than feared.

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* Daniel Silke is director of the Political Futures Consultancy based in Cape Town, and a noted political economy analyst and keynote speaker. He is author of the book Tracking the Future published by Tafelberg. Views expressed are his own. His website is www.danielsilke.com and you can follow him on Twitter at DanielSilke.